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ARTICLES
THE QUALITY OF MERCY MUST BE RESTRAINED,
AND OTHER LESSONS IN LEARNING
TO LOVE THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
FRANK 0. BOWMAN, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1987, the sentence imposed on a person convicted of violating
federal criminal law has been governed by the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 and by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, whose creation was
mandated by that Act. In 1992, Judge Josd Cabranes, now of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, gave this assessment of
the Guidelines:
First, the Guidelines system is probably the most significant
development in "judging" in the federal judicial system since
the adoption in 1938 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure; no one can pretend to understand the work of
federal judges today without some appreciation of the
Guidelines system and what it has done to the courts and
what it has done to the work of judges, prosecutors, defense
lawyers and others who work in the federal judicial system.
Second, the Sentencing Guidelines system is a failure - a
dismal failure, a fact well known and fully understood by
virtually everyone who is associated with the federal justice
system. I
* Visiting Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law, 1996-97.
Formerly Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of Florida, 1989-96, and
Special Counsel, United States Sentencing Commission, 1995-96 (on loan from U.S.
Department of Justice). J.D., 1979, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1976, Colorado College.
This article grew out of an address to the Washington & Lee University Law School on
March 25, 1996. 1 am grateful to the Frances Lewis Law Center of Washington & Lee
University for sponsoring my appearance. I am indebted to Professors Scott Sundby,
William Geimer, Roger Groot, Stephen Sepinuck, Michael Goldsmith, Michael Tonry,
and Julie O'Sullivan, as well as to Robert C. Bowman, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department
of Justice; Herbert D. Bowman, Deputy District Attorney, San Diego, California; and
Roger W. Haines, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, San Diego, California, for their
thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this article.
1. Jos6 A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, 207 N.Y. L.J.,
Feb. 11, 1992, at 2 (emphasis added).
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I agree wholeheartedly with Judge Cabranes' first conclusion. One
can hardly overstate the significance of the Guidelines, not merely for
judges and judging, but for every aspect of federal criminal practice. On
the other hand, I could not disagree more with Judge Cabranes' second
pronouncement. The Guidelines are not a "dismal failure." They are not
a failure at all, much less a dismal one. They are, at worst, a marked
improvement over the system they replaced and are, on balance, a
notable, albeit certainly imperfect, success.
In the remarks that follow, I do four things. First, for those
unfamiliar with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, I begin by explaining
briefly how the Guidelines work. Second, I endeavor to show why Judge
Cabranes is wrong, absolutely wrong in declaring the Guidelines a failure,
and mostly wrong in the specific criticisms he and others level against the
Guidelines.' Third, after jousting with Judge Cabranes a bit, I discuss
some problems with the current federal sentencing system, most notably
the sheer length of narcotics sentences. Finally, I comment briefly on
some of the implications of the Guidelines, and the principles which
undergird them, for broader questions of crime control and social policy.
II. THE GUIDELINES
A. The World Before the Guidelines
The United States Sentencing Guidelines represent a radical departure
from previous federal practice. Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 (SRA),3 criminal sentences in the federal courts were said to be
"indeterminate." The word "indeterminate" is often used to refer to two
different, but related, ideas in the sentencing context.
2. 1 have elected Judge Cabranes as a jousting partner for four principal reasons.
First, he is among the most vigorous and vocal judicial critics of the Guidelines, and has
expressed his opposition to them in a variety of forums. See, e.g., Jos A. Cabranes,
Letter to the Editor: Incoherent Sentencing Guidelines, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1992, at
All. Second, although Judge Cabranes often expresses himself more pungently than
others who share his point of view, his writings and speeches are certainly representative
of a significant body of judicial and academic opinion. See, e.g., MICHAEL ToNRY,
SENmENCIN MATTERS 11 (1996) ("Few outside the federal commission would disagree
that the federal guidelines have been a disaster."). Third, despite my disagreements with
Judge Cabranes on this issue, he is a capable and distinguished jurist. Finally, what he
thinks may be of more than representative interest-he was prominently mentioned as a
candidate for the last open seat on the Supreme Court, and his undoubted qualifications
may yet carry him to that eminence.
3. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 218(a)(5),
98 Stat. 1976, 2027.
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First, an indeterminate sentencing system is one in which the judge
sentences a defendant to a range of years, say five to twenty, but the
number of years the defendant actually serves is then entirely in the hands
of an administrative body like a parole board.' Prior to the SRA, a
similar system existed in federal court.' The federal judge sentenced a
defendant to a specific term of years, say fifteen, but the percentage of
that fifteen years that the defendant would actually spend in a cell was
controlled primarily by the United States Parole Commission.' The
Parole Commission had its own guidelines, and the amount of real time
a defendant might serve under those guidelines was undoubtedly more
predictable than it would have been without them.7 But substantial
4. For a discussion of the historical development of parole in Europe and the
United States, see generally TODD R. CLEAR & GEORGE F. COLE, AMERICAN
CORRECTIONS, 396-99 (2d ed. 1990); REID MONTGOMERY, JR. & STEVEN DILLINOHAM,
PROBATION AND PAROLE IN PRACTICE 25-32 (1983).
5. The United States Board of Parole, which later became the United States
Parole Commission, was created by Congress in 1930. DON M. GOTrPREDSON ET AL.,
GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE AND SENTENCING 2 (1978). The legal powers of the Parole
Commission as it existed immediately before the adoption of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines are set out at 18 U.S.C. § 4201-4218 (1982), repealed by Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 218(a)(7), 98 Stat. 1976, 2027. For
a general study of the operation of parole decision-making, see GOTTFREDSON ET AL.,
supra.
6. A federal district court had three options when imposing a sentence of
imprisonment: (1) The court could impose a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (repealed
1984), requiring the defendant to serve one-third of his sentence before becoming eligible
for parole. (2) The court could impose a maximum term of imprisonment pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 4205(b)(1) (repealed 1984), but reduce the minimum term required before parole
eligibility to less than one-third of the maximum sentence. (3) The court could fix a
maximum term and specify that "the prisoner may be released on parole at such time as
the [Parole] Commission may determine." 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) (repealed 1984).
When the court imposed a minimum term under either 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) or §
4205(b)(1), the Parole Commission retained control over when the defendant would be
released after he served the minimum sentence and achieved parole eligibility. In the pre-
Guidelines period, "federal courts normally sentenced adult offenders pursuant to" §
4205(a). United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 1989). In addition,
there was a statutory entitlement to so-called "good time" credit, up to nearly one-third
of the stated sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (repealed 1984).
7. The creation of parole guidelines was mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 4203(a)(1)
(repealed 1984). For a discussion of the federal parole guidelines and their operation, see
GOrTFREDSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 22-37; see also Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The
Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 228-29 (1993) (discussing the genesis of the
parole guidelines).
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uncertainty remained, and the Commission retained significant legal and
practical control over release dates!
Second, although it is probably a misuse of the word, the term
"indeterminate" is often used to describe another central aspect of federal
sentencing before the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Prior to their
enactment, the judge had virtually unlimited discretion to sentence a
convicted defendant anywhere within the range created by the statutory
maximum and minimum penalties for the offense or offenses of
conviction.9 In other words, if the statute said that the penalty for
spitting on a federal sidewalk was up to five years imprisonment, the
district court could sentence an illegal expectorator to probation, or one
year, or two years, or five years. As long as the judge sentenced within
the statutory range, virtually no rules governed the judge's choice of a
particular sentence. 0 There was no limitation on either the type or
quality of information a judge could consider at sentencing." A judge
8. The language of 18 U.S.C. § 4206(a) (repealed 1984) indicates the breadth of
the Parole Commission's discretion. The statute describes the Commission's parole power
as follows:
(a) If an eligible prisoner has substantially observed the rules of the
institution or institutions to which he has been confined, and if the
Commission, upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the prisoner, determines:
(1) that release would not depreciate the seriousness of his
offense or promote disrespect for the law; and
(2) that release would not jeopardize the public welfare;
subject to the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section, and
pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the Commission pursuant to section
4203(a)(1), such prisoner shall be released.
9. See David Fisher, Fifth Amendment-Prosecutorial Discretion Not Absolute:
Constitutional Limits on Decision Not to File Substantial Assistance Motions, 83 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 744, 745 (1993) ("Prior to the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act,
federal judges enjoyed extremely broad discretion in sentencing. A judge could impose
any sentence she thought proper as long as it did not exceed the statutory maximum.");
Steven S. Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64 MINN. L. REV. 669, 677 (1980) (referring
to pre-Guidelines sentencing practices and noting that "the court's [sentencing] discretion
nonetheless remains quite broad under most modern statutes"); Stanley A. Weigel, The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REV. 83, 89 (1988)
(discussing pre-Guidelines sentencing practices).
10. For example, federal law prior to the enactment of the SRA provided that, as
to "any offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment," the court was free to
suspend the imposition of a sentence of incarceration and place the defendant on
probation, so long as the judge was "satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest
of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby." 18 U.S.C. § 3651
(repealed 1984).
11. "No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background,
character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."
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properly could consider information about the defendant's troubled
childhood, arrest record, acquitted conduct, uncharged conduct, rumored
conduct, education, family circumstances, substance abuse problems or
virtually any other factor the judge felt to be important. None of this
information was subject to filtering by the Federal Rules of Evidence, 2
and the judge was required to make no findings of fact. Moreover, so
long as the final sentence was within statutory limits, it was essentially
unreviewable by a court of appeals. 3
18 U.S.C. § 3661 (repealed 1984); see also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,249-50
(1949) (stating that due process allows a judge broad discretion as to the sources and types
of information relied upon at sentencing).
12. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing. FED. R. EviD.
1101(d)(3). Rule 1101(d)(3) was adopted in 1975 and thus was in effect both before and
after the creation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 93-595, art. III, 88 Stat. 1931 (1975); see also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at
250-51 (stating that due process does not require confrontation or cross-examination in
sentencing or passing on probation).
13. See Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2045 (1996) ("Before the
Guidelines system, a federal criminal sentence within statutory limits was, for all practical
purposes, not reviewable on appeal."); Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431
(1974) (reiterating "the general proposition that once it is determined that a sentence is
within the limitations set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review
is at an end."); see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n. 16 (1983) ('[Ilt is not the
role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to
the appropriateness of a particular sentence."). Although the appellate courts lacked the
power to review the substance, which is to say the length, of sentences imposed by district
courts, they retained some ability to review the process through which sentences were
determined. The outer limits of the district court's discretion were defined by concepts
of due process. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (vacating on due
process grounds a sentence that relied on prior uncounseled convictions); Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (holding that a sentence based on erroneous factual
information violated due process); United States v. Clements, 634 F.2d 183, 186 (5th
Cir. 1981) (holding that the court will "not review the severity of a sentence imposed
within statutory limits, but will carefully scrutinize the judicial process by which the
punishment was imposed"); Herron v. United States, 551 F.2d 62, 64 (5th Cir. 1977)
("The severity of a sentence imposed within statutory limits will not be reviewed.");
United States v. Cavazos, 530 F.2d 4, 5 (5th Cir. 1976) ("We . . . do not review the
severity of a sentence imposed within the statutory limits. But we have appellate
responsibility to give careful scrutiny to the judicial process by which the particular
punishment was determined."); United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir.
1973) ("[The] discretion [of sentencing judges] is not, and has never been absolute, and
while the appellate courts have little if any power to review substantively the length of
sentences [citation omitted], it is our duty to insure that rudimentary notions of fairness
are observed in the process at which the sentence is determined."); see also Fisher, supra
note 9, at 745 (noting that before the SRA there was no appellate review of sentencing
decisions); Stith and Koh, supra note 7, at 226 ("For over two hundred years, there was
virtually no appellate review of the trial judge's discretion.").
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The watchword of this system was "individualized sentencing."14
The system recognized reluctantly society's call for retribution for crime,
and the system's defenders, if pressed, might grudgingly acknowledge that
lawbreakers may deserve punishment, 5 but in many quarters the notion
of retribution or "just deserts" as a rationale for sentencing was either
scorned completely or looked upon as more than a little barbaric. 6 The
rehabilitative ideal, 7 what some have called the "medical model" of
sentencing,' was at flood tide.' The article of faith upon which
sentencing rested was that criminal deviance could be treated like any
14. The Supreme Court embraced "individualized sentencing" as the philosophy
of federal sentencing in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (referring to
"[tloday's philosophy of individualizing sentences"). See also Bums v. United States, 287
U.S. 216, 220 (1932) ("It is necessary to individualize each case, to give that careful,
humane, and comprehensive consideration to the particular situation of each offender
which would be possible only in the exercise of a broad discretion.").
15. In Williams v. New York, Justice Black declared, "retribution is no longer the
dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have
become important goals of criminal jurisprudence." 337 U.S. at 247-48. Professor
Francis A. Allen writes that Justice Black's dictum "expressed the enlightened opinion,
not only of the judiciary, but also of the public at large." FRANcIS A. ALLEN, THE
DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 5 (1981).
16. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 193 (1975) (viewing the
correctional system as intended "to isolate and to punish" would "strike many enlightened
readers today as cruel, even barbaric").
Retribution, for which the more descriptive term may be "desert" or "just deserts,"
as in, "He got what he deserved," has gone in and out of vogue as a rationale for
punishment. When retribution is disfavored, as it was during the era of indeterminate
sentencing which preceded the Guidelines, the tendency is to equate retribution with
"revenge," a term suggesting mean-spirited, vindictive and uncivilized behavior. For
example, the 1972 edition of the Model Sentencing Act declares without explanation,
"Sentences should not be based upon revenge and retribution." ANDREW VON HIRSCH,
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 46 (1976) (quoting 1972 edition of
MODEL SENTENCING ACT).
17. See generally, ALLEN supra note 15 (discussing the rise and fall of the
'rehabilitative ideal").
18. Michigan purportedly was the first state to adopt a sentencing system based
at least in part on a "medical model." United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1207
n.6 (11th Cir. 1989); see also PAMALA L. GRISET, DETERMINATE SENTENCING: THE
PROMISE AND REALITY OF RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 11 (1991) (discussing the "rise of the
rehabilitative juggernaut" between 1877 and 1970 and noting that "[a] medical analogue
was frequently invoked"); ALLEN, supra note 15, at 35 (referring to the "medical model"
of sentencing).
19. Professor Allen notes that "rehabilitation . . . seen as the exclusive
justification of penal sanctions . . . was very nearly the stance of some exuberant
American theorists in the mid-twentieth century . . . ." Id. at 3; see also AMERICAN
FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 83 (1971) ("Despite [its]
shortcomings the treatment approach receives nearly unanimous support from those
working in the field of criminal justice, even the most progressive and humanitarian.").
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other disorder. The cure was to be effected through a combination of
deterrence motivated by the unpleasant experience of incarceration, and
personal renewal spurred by counseling, drug treatment, job training and
the like. Penitentiaries would inspire penance and reformatories would
reform.' Because the precise combination of punitive and reinforcing
measures which would maximize the chances of rehabilitation presumably
varied from person to person, the sentencing judge was guaranteed access
to the widest possible array of information about every defendant."
The theory of pre-Guidelines indeterminate sentencing was essentially
utilitarian,22 but it was a utilitarianism resting on a more hopeful view
of human nature than is currently in fashion. Indeed, it took a hopeful
view not only of the nature and capabilities of those convicted of
crime,' but of those who fixed their penalties. At the time of
sentencing, the system assumed that judges steeped in the law and the
social sciences, and seasoned by the experience of sentencing many
offenders, were percipient enough to choose penalties that maximized the
rehabilitative chances of offenders.' After sentencing, the assumption
20. The very names we give to American prisons illustrate their genesis in the
rehabilitative ideal. The term "penitentiary" was coined by Pennsylvania Quakers, who
conceived of their prison regime of confinement, work and prayer as conducive to
penance and thus to the reform of the offender. For a description of the Pennsylvania
system, see GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY
SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 41, 83-84 (Southern
Illinois University Press 1964). See generally H.E. BARNES, THE EVOLUTION OF
PENOLOGY IN PENNSYLVANIA (1927); Carl E. Schneider, The Rise of Prisons and the
Origins of the Rehabilitative Ideal, 77 MICH. L. REV. 707 (1979).
21. Speaking of rehabilitationist sentencing in general, one commentator wrote:
"Everything about the offender's life was relevant to the pursuit of the ideal treatment
program. Each case was different, each required a different response." GRISET, supra
note 18, at 12; see also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249-51 (1949)
(emphasizing that individualized sentenced required judicial access to the broadest possible
array of information about the offender).
22. See Barbara S. Barrett, Sentencing Guidelines: Recommendations for
Sentencing Reform, 57 Mo. L. REV. 1077, 1079 (1992) (noting shift during sentencing
reform movement away from "an emphasis on utilitarian aims, particularly treatment");
Nemerson, supra note 9, at 683 (describing then-predominant justifications for criminal
punishment as "represent[ing] an implicit, and often explicit, adoption of a utilitarian
moral theory").
23. Of course, one might also conclude that a view of human nature which
assumes human attitudes and behavior to be highly malleable and subject to significant and
easily predictable modification by agents of the state is not particularly "hopeful" at all.
See, e.g., Professor Allen's discussion of the similarities between the rehabilitative ideal
in American penology and the theory and practice of the penal system in the People's
Republic of China. ALLEN, supra note 15, at 16-18.
24. GRISET, supra note 18, at 1 (discussing the premises of the "rehabilitative
regime" and noting that it rested on the assumptions that "case by case decisionmaking
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was that trained penologists could determine when a prisoner had been
rehabilitated' and thus advise the Parole Commission about release
dates .26
A variety of complaints arose about this system. First, critics said
that it led to tremendous sentencing disparity." Without guidelines for
judges, and with virtually no review of their decisions, every federal
district judge was a law unto him or herself. There was no requirement
even that each judge treat similar defendants similarly. Judges were free
to give different sentences based on factors as whimsical as dress or
hairstyle or a "gut feeling" that this defendant was good and that one was
bad, so long as the judges were not impolitic enough to put the more
extreme of such subjective assessments on the record.2' Even if one
should be encouraged; that future behavior could be predicted; that criminal-justice
practitioners possessed the expertise required to make individualized sentencing
decisions").
25. "The indeterminate sentence. . . is expressive of the rehabilitation ideal: a
convict will be released from an institution, not at the end of a fixed period, but when
someone (a parole board, a sentencing board) decides he is 'ready' to be released."
WILSON, supra note 16, at 191.
26. See GOTTFREDSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 41-67 for a discussion of how
social scientists advising the Parole Commission designed and tested statistical models in
order to generate predictions about the risk of recidivism for potential parolees.
27. One of the first and most influential critics of pre-Guidelines sentencing on
the ground of unjustifiable sentence disparity was Judge Marvin E. Frankel. He said of
the indeterminate sentencing system in federal courts, that "the almost wholly unchecked
and sweeping powers we give to judges in the fashioning of sentences are terrifying and
intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of law." MARVIN E.
FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAw WITHOtrr ORDER 5 (1973) [hereinafter FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES); see also Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 23 (1967) (finding
sentencing disparity to be pervasive); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS 142 (1973) (finding sentencing disparity
to be pervasive); Peter B. Hoffman & Barbara Stone-Meierhoefer, Application of
Guidelines to Sentencing, 3 LAW AND PSYCHOL. REV. 53, 53-56 (1977) (describing
criticisms of then-extant sentencing practices on the ground of "unwarranted sentencing
variation"). Peter Hoffman later became the principal draftsman of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.
28. Even before the adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, courts could
not rely on certain types of information. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S.
443 (1972) (remanding for resentencing because lower court's reliance on prior
uncounseled convictions violated due process); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948)
(holding that a sentence based on erroneous information violated due process). Neither
before nor after the adoption of the Guidelines could a judge condition his sentencing
decision on the race of the offender. See, e.g., United States v. Schmidt, 47 F.3d 188,
190 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a defendant may not waive right to appeal a sentence
based on constitutionally impermissible factor such as race); United States v. Manin, 961
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believed federal judges to be rigorously rational and internally consistent
in their own courtrooms, there was no guarantee of consistency from
judge to judge, even when they sat in the same courthouse. A defendant
sentenced to ten years in front of Judge Smith might get two years down
the hall in front of Judge Jones."
Second, critics believed that plea bargaining exacerbated the potential
for disparity between similarly-situated defendants. ° While the parties
could not exercise absolute control over a judge's sentence, they could at
least limit the judge's discretion by negotiating a plea to a less serious
offense or to fewer than all possible charges. Therefore, because of plea
bargaining, the ranges within which Judge Smith and Judge Jones would
set out to sentence two similar defendants might be very different
depending on the skills and tenacity of the prosecutors and defense
attorneys."
F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding the same, that a defendant may not waive right
to appeal a sentence based on constitutionally impermissible factor); United States v.
Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that "even the appearance that a
sentence reflects a defendant's race or nationality will ordinarily require a remand for
resentencing"); United States v. Edwards-Franco, 885 F.2d 1002, 1005-06 (2d Cir. 1989)
(pre-Guidelines, remanding for new trial based on "appearance" that district court may
have imposed higher sentence because of defendant's nationality).
29. "[Flederal trial judges, answerable only to their varieties of consciences, may
and do send people to prison for terms that may vary in any given case from none at all
up to-five, ten, thirty, or more years. This means in the great majority of federal criminal
cases that a defendant who comes up for sentencing has no way of knowing or reliably
predicting whether he will walk out of the courtroom on probation, or be locked up for
a term of years that may consume the rest of his life, or something in between."
FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 27, at 6. But see Jeffrey Standen, Plea
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471 (1993). Professor
Standen claims that pre-Guidelines sentencing was more predictable than Guidelines
sentencing, and that the parties' ability to predict sentencing outcomes "constrained" and
"restricted" the plea bargaining process. Id. at 1502-04. However, Professor Standen
provides neither empirical nor anecdotal evidence for the counter-intuitive notion that
sentencing in an indeterminate system is more predictable than determinate sentencing
under the Guidelines.
30. The practice of plea bargaining is, of course, of long standing. It was
explicitly recognized and approved in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). For
a general discussion of plea bargaining and its limits, see Arnold Enker, Perspectives on
Plea Bargaining, TASK FORCE REPORT-THE COURTS, NCJ-000176 (1974); Comment,
Constitutional Constraints on Prosecutorial Discretion in Plea Bargaining, 17 Hous. L.
REv. 753 (1980); see also Bradford C. Mank, Rewarding Defendant Cooperation Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Judges vs. Prosecutors, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 399, 403
n.23 (1990) (arguing that before the Federal Sentencing Guidelines judges used their
discretion to "moderate in part the disparities caused by plea bargaining").
"31. Of course, plea bargaining could reduce judge-to-judge disparity. Assuming
a reasonably consistent view within a prosecutor's office regarding the appropriate
sentence for a given crime, and assuming that prosecutors knew the sentencing habits of
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Third, critics observed that because of the parole system, the real
power to determine the length of time a defendant actually spent in prison
rested not with judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys or legislators, but
with a parole board that operated substantially out of public view.
Moreover, the variability of its decisionmaking added yet another stage
at which disparity could flourish.
Fourth, indeterminate sentencing was thought to erode public faith
in the criminal justice system. Because defendants rarely served anything
close to the amount of time the judge announced, observers unfamiliar
with the system's rituals saw the system as fraudulent. 2 Judges would
declaim grandly, "I sentence you to ten years in the custody of the
Attorney General of the United States!"' but everybody in the
courtroom knew the defendant would almost certainly be on the street in
a little over three.
Fifth, observers had the sense that lazy prosecutors were
indiscriminately plea bargaining away cases against vicious criminals to
reduce their workloads, and that soft judges were letting criminals get
away with minimal sentences.'
Finally, I suspect that all these critiques rooted in concerns about
fairness would not have led to global reform if people felt that the system
worked, in the sense that it reduced or controlled crime. Whether any
criminal justice system in a democratic society can, on its own, "control
crime" is a very big question.3" Nonetheless, the pre-Guidelines system
rested on the dual premises: (a) that the correctional system could reduce
crime by rehabilitating criminals; and (b) that judges, probation officers
and parole boards knew enough about human nature to induce
rehabilitation and to recognize rehabilitation when they saw it. When
local judges, plea bargains were often crafted to constrain a judge's discretion within an
acceptable range.
32. See Barrett, supra note 22, at 1078 (noting that "[determinate sentencing is
appealing because it offers truth in sentencing"); Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Prosecutorial
Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L.
REv. 105, 115 (1994) (discussing criticism of pre-Guidelines sentencing as "dishonest"
because the Parole Commission, rather than the judge, determined the actual length of
sentence).
33. This is the customary formal phrasing used to pronounce a federal sentence.
Because federal prisoners serve their sentences at institutions managed by the Bureau of
Prisons, an element of the U.S. Department of Justice, a federal prisoner is technically
"in the custody of" the head of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General.
34. See Stith & Koh, supra note 7, at 227 (discussing the pre-Guidelines system
and noting that "critics from the political right expressed dissatisfaction with the perceived
leniency of sentencing judges and parole officials").
35. 1 assume that sufficiently harsh measures imposed by a totalitarian state such
as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union in the Stalinist era can drastically reduce many
types of crime, albeit at a dramatic cost to personal liberty.
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people lost faith in these premises, the perception, at least, became that
the country had a sentencing system which was both unfair and
ineffective.' At the end of the day, the one unanswerable critique of a
primarily utilitarian system is that it does not work.
The reform effort that culminated in the Sentencing Reform Act and
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines37 had three objectives:"
1) Ensuring that similarly situated defendants received
similar sentences;
2) Making the sentencing system "honest" in the sense of
requiring that a defendant serve all, or nearly all, of
the sentence pronounced by the court, and;
3) Raising at least some sentencing levels," primarily
those for narcotics offenses,' and to a lesser but still
significant degree, those for white collar crimes."'
36. See Barrett, supra note 22, at 1079 (noting that during the 1970s "the
perception that crime rates were out of control led some officials to demand surer and
stiffer sanctions against criminals as a means of preventing crime"); Nemerson, supra note
9, at 685-86 ('In part, the massive professional and academic disillusionment with the
therapeutic model stems from the simple practical inability of the criminal justice system
to reform serious offenders effectively through incarceration.").
37. For a detailed discussion of the process that led to the creation of the
Guidelines, see generally Stith & Koh, supra note 7.
38. Justice Stephen Breyer, one of the original sentencing commissioners, has
written that Congress had "two primary purposes" in enacting the SRA; namely, "honesty
in sentencing," and "reduc[ingj 'unjustifiably wide' sentencing disparity." Stephen
Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They
Depend, 17 HoFsTRA L. REv. 1, 3 (1988). Likewise, Cynthia K.Y. Lee asserts that
Congress was "primarily interested in furthering two values" when it passed the SRA:
'(1) uniformity and proportionality in sentencing ...and (2) honesty and certainty in
sentencing . . . ." Lee, supra note 32, at 115-16. Karen Bjorkman identifies the
objectives of the Guidelines as an effort "to be honest, uniform, and proportional for
varying degrees of criminal conduct." Karen Bjorkman, Note, Who's the Judge? The
Eighth Circuit's Struggle With the Sentencing Guidelines and the Section SKI.1
Departure, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 731, 736 (1992).
39. See Stith & Koh, supra note 7, at 284-85 (stating that, in general, the
Guidelines have achieved congressional intent and thus "[ilt is no accident that the
percentage of defendants being imprisoned and the length of sentences have increased.").
40. 28 U.S.C. § 994(i) (1994) calls for a "substantial term of imprisonment" for
felony drug offenders. For a discussion of the origins of this legislative admonition, see
Stith & Koh, supra note 7, at 268-69.
41. See Breyer, supra note 38, at 20-21; Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing
Guidelines: A Need for Creative Collaboration, 101 YALE L.J. 2043,2047 (1992) ("[Tihe
Commission produced guidelines that actually increase the overall severity [of federal
sentences) . . . taking particular aim at so-called white-collar offenders whom the
Commission found (perhaps correctly) to have been treated with undue solicitude.").
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B. History of the Guidelines
Congress began its reform of the federal sentencing system by
abolishing parole, and with it, the type of indeterminacy that parole
created. 2 Congress decreed that henceforth inmates would serve at least
eighty-five percent of their stated sentences. ' Ten years in prison now
means ten years in prison, with only the possibility of fifteen percent, or
about eighteen months, off for good behavior.
Next Congress set out to rein in judges by creating guidelines," but
did not attempt to do so entirely on its own. Congress recognized that it
could not create an entire sentencing scheme alone. It based this
conclusion on the two very sensible considerations that too many details
were involved, and that the end product might require periodic tinkering.
Consequently, Congress created the United States Sentencing
Commission.'
The Sentencing Commission set out to create a structure for federal
sentencing that would make the whole process more predictable and less
discretionary. The Commission took several years to create a new federal
sentencing system. When the Commissioners were finished, they
42. U.S. SENTENCINO COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCINO GUIDELINES MANUAL,
ch. 1 pt. A(3) (1995) (intro. comment) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]; see William W. Wilkins
et al., Competing Sentencing Policies in a "War On Drugs" Era, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 305 (1993). "The [Sentencing Reform Act] reflected Congress' desire for honesty
in sentencing by abolishing parole and by substantially reducing and restructuring good
behavior adjustments. This represented a change from an indeterminate to a determinate,
'real time' sentencing system." Id. at 306. Judge Wilkins was the first Chairman of the
Sentencing Commission. At the time of the article, the other authors, Phyllis Newton and
John R. Steer, were the Commission's Staff Director and General Counsel, respectively.
Interestingly, the Parole Commission is still in existence over a decade after its
nominal abolition. The practical necessity of dealing with those federal prisoners who
were sentenced before the advent of the Guidelines and who still enjoy parole eligibility
under the indeterminate sentencing system required an extension of the Commission's life.
43. An inmate can earn up to fifty-four days per year of good time credit,
beginning at the end of the first year of his term. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1994); see also
U.S.S.G. Ch. 1 Pt. A(3) (intro. comment).
44. See Fisher, supra note 9, at 748 ("[Olne of the Sentencing Reform Act's
primary goals was to abate judicial discretion in the sentencing arena.").
45. The Sentencing Commission is an "independent commission in the judicial
branch of the United States," whose voting members are appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1994). The Commission consists of seven
voting members, at least three of whom must be federal judges, and no more than four
of whom may be members of the same political party. Id. The Attorney General, or her
designee, is an ex officio, non-voting member. Id. The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act and the institution of the Sentencing
Commission in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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submitted the result for public comment, and then for congressional
approval. The Guidelines became effective on November 1, 1987.'
Each year thereafter, the Commission has modified and amended the
Guidelines through the same process: promulgation of proposed
amendments for public comment, review of public comment, and
submission to Congress. Congress can approve amendments by simply
remaining silent. It can revise the Commission's product. Or it can
reject the Commission's work altogether 7 (as it recently and notoriously
did with amendments to the Guidelines regarding crack cocaine and
money laundering)."
In delegating this task, Congress constrained the Commission by
enacting fairly extensive directives about the shape and content of its
ultimate product. The most important of these directives were probably
the so-called "25% rule," which restricted the size of the ranges within
which judges were allowed to exercise unfettered sentencing discretion,49
and the creation of stiff, some would say draconian, mandatory minimum
penalties for certain crimes, most notably narcotics offenses.'
46. U.S.S.G. Ch. 1 Pt. A(2) (1995).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1994) describes the procedure for amending the
Guidelines. The Commission is to "promulgate" proposed amendments no later than the
first of May each year. Id. "Promulgate" means, among other things, to distribute to all
federal courts and to the U.S. Probation System. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a), (p). Amendments
take effect automatically on the first of November of the year in which they are
promulgated unless "otherwise modified or disapproved by Act of Congress." 28 U.S.C.
§ 9 94 (p).
48. Act of Oct. 30, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334 (1995) (disapproving
of proposed amendments to the Guidelines that would have changed the ratio between
.crack" and powder cocaine used in sentencing for cocaine offenses under U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1, and would have modified the guideline for money laundering offenses, U.S.S.G.
§ 2S1.1).
49. The "25% rule" provides:
If a sentence specified by the guidelines includes a term of imprisonment,
the maximum of the range established for such a term shall not exceed the
minimum of that range by more than the greater of 25 percent or 6
months, except that, if the minimum term of the range is 30 years or
more, the maximum may be life imprisonment.
28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2). An examination of the Guideline Sentencing Table, Table 1 infra
note 57 and accompanying text, reveals that each point on the grid is a sentencing range
that conforms to the "25% rule"-the top of the range is twenty-five percent higher than
the bottom of the range. See also U.S.S.G. Ch. 1 Pt. A(2).
50. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1994) (mandating minimum sentence of five
years imprisonment for simple possession of five grams or more of cocaine base); 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) (mandating minimum sentence of five years imprisonment for
possession with intent to distribute five hundred grams or more of cocaine); 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) (mandating minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment for possession
with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine); see also Stith & Koh, supra
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Mandatory minimum sentences established a floor below which sentences
for certain crimes could not drop, and in doing so, they affected the
architecture of the Guidelines. In effect, mandatory minimums were a set
of fixed, immovable points around which the Guidelines architects were
obliged to design their edifice. I do not mean to suggest that
congressional directives pre-ordained the precise structure of the
Guidelines. Despite those directives, the Sentencing Commission could
have produced something very different than it did.51 Still, many
aspects of the Guidelines cannot be understood without recognizing the
limits Congress placed on the enterprise.'
C. The Guidelines
The Guidelines abandon rehabilitation as a goal of sentencing. While
the Sentencing Reform Act alludes, at least obliquely, to rehabilitative
measures,53 the goal of rehabilitation is scarcely mentioned in the
Guidelines themselves, or in their official statement of purpose.'
note 7, at 259-61 (discussing congressional passage in 1980s of stiff minimum mandatory
penalties for drug offenses).
51. See, e.g., Stith & Koh, supra note 7, at 283 (describing many choices made
by the Sentencing Commission that were, in the authors' view, not mandated by the
enabling legislation).
52. See Stewart Dalzell, One Cheer for the Guidelines, 40 VILL. L. REv. 317,
325 (1995) ("[I1t seems to me that much of the criticism of the Guidelines is really
criticism of what Congress has directed the Commission to do with them."). But see
Michael Tonry, Salvaging the Sentencing Guidelines in Seven Easy Steps, 4 FED. SENT.
REP. 355, 355 (1992) (arguing that the "objectionable" features of the Guidelines stem
from the Commission's decisions, not from the statute).
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (1994).
The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this
subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be
imposed, shall consider. . . the need for the sentence imposed . . . to
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
Id. Likewise, the SRA permits the sentencing judge to consider an offender's need for
rehabilitation in prescribing the conditions of probation, § 3563(b), or supervised release,
§ 3583(d). Finally, as the court noted in United States v. Scroggins, the SRA "permits
the sentencing court to consider an offender's ability to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law when deciding whether a sentence of probation or incarceration
is appropriate." 880 F.2d 1204, 1208 n.10 (11th Cir. 1989).
54. One of the only times rehabilitation is mentioned in the Guidelines manual is
on the first page, where it is observed that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 "provides
for the development of guidelines that will further the basic purposes of criminal
punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation." U.S.S.G.
Ch. 1 Pt. A(2) (1995).
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Instead, the focus is on a somewhat imprecise amalgam of "just deserts"
retributivism and utilitarian "crime control" theories of deterrence and
incapacitation.' Moreover, the Guidelines move away from a "charge
offense" or "offense of conviction" system of sentencing and toward a so-
called "modified real offense system."-4
1. THE GRID
The best way to start looking at the Guidelines is probably to go
backwards. The 396-page book containing the 1995 version of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines is, in a sense, nothing more than a big set
of instructions for one particular chart-the Sentencing Table. 7  For
easy reference, the Sentencing Table is reproduced below as Table 1.
The goal of Guidelines calculations is to arrive at numbers for the
horizontal and vertical axes on the sentencing grid, which in turn generate
an intersection in the body of the grid. Each such intersection designates,
55. In the section of the Guidelines manual headed "The Basic Approach," the
Sentencing Commission states:
A philosophical problem arose when the Commission attempted to
reconcile the differing perceptions of the purposes of criminal punishment.
Most observers of the criminal law agree that the ultimate aim of the law
itself, and of punishment in particular, is the control of crime. Beyond
this point, however, the consensus seems to break down. Some argue that
appropriate punishment should be defined primarily on the basis of the
principle of "just deserts." . . . Others argue that punishment should be
imposed primarily on the basis of practical "crime control"
considerations. This theory calls for sentences that most effectively lessen
the likelihood of future crime, either by deterring others or incapacitating
the defendant.
Adherents of each of these points of view urged the Commission to
choose between them and accord one primacy over the other. As a
practical matter, this choice was unnecessary because in most sentencing
decisions the application of either philosophy will produce the same or
similar results.
U.S.S.G. Ch. 1 Pt. A(3) (emphasis added).
The conclusion that just deserts and crime control theories of punishment will
produce "the same or similar" outcomes "in most sentencing decisions" seems, at best,
debatable. For example, I argue, infra notes 228-37 and accompanying text, that although
drug traffickers may "deserve" very long prison sentences, sentences as long as those
often imposed for drug offenses under the Guidelines are very difficult to justify on
utilitarian crime control grounds.
56. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 1 Pt. A(4)(a) (describing the Guidelines as a compromise
containing elements of both the charge offense and real offense systems); see also infra
notes 98-100 and accompanying text, for further discussion of the "modified real offense"
character of the Guidelines.
57. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 Pt. A.
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not a specific sentence, but a sentencing range expressed in months. For
example, a defendant whose offense level is 26, and whose criminal
history category is I, is subject to a sentencing range of 63-78 months.'
Table 1
SENTENCING TABLE
(in months of imprisonment)
Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)
O6W. I II m IV V Vi
Led (ow1) 0 3) (4.9.4 (7.3.8 (4. 1t.2 1 (ar
0-6 0-6 0-6 0.6 0-6 0-6
Z * A
S 0- 0-6 0-6 0-7 0-6 1-7
-6 0-6 0-6 0.6 Z-SI 3-9
30-3 6 0-6 4- 4-70 6-12
0-6 -46 I--S 4-10 6-12 9-157
0-6 
2-8 6-12 7790_ 1-1
7 -6 7-71 6-70 77-6 2-82-11 13-21
1- 6-12 10-16 13-21 12-24
Z 2 -4 10 6-12 - 12-1 18-24 21-27
to 6-12 I 8-14 10-16 15-21 21-27 3-30
z c 70-8 10-16 12-19- 18-24 2-30 27-3$
12 106 13-21 21-27 27-33 30-37
Z-n D 13 12-18 13-21 19-24 24-30 3047 SS.41
14 13-21 18-24 21-27 2-33 $3-41 $7-46
is 11144 21-27 24-30 30-37 $7-46 41-31
16 21-2 24-30 27-33 33-41 41-31 4l6-"
17 24-30 27-33 30-47 37-46 46-I7 140-3
8 27-33 -37 334A 41-i1 d1.. 57-71
19 30"37 33-41 3746 46-57 57-71 63-79
20 33-41 37.46 41-51 31-63 63-71 70-"7
21 37-46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-P1 77-96
]3 41-31 46-37 31-60 63-78 T7-915 W4103
23 46-57 51-63 57-71 70-87 54-10. 92-115
34 51-63 57-71 63-78 77-96 92-113 100-125
25 57-71 63-78 70-87 W4103 100-125 110-137
26 63-78 70-17 78-917 92-115 11-137 120130
27 7/0-8P 78.97 8'7-106 10012.5 12150 130-162
28 71-97 97-108 97-121 110-157 1I0162 140-173
58. Id.
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Criminal Hitory Category (Criminal History Points)
a66 I TI Nfl IV V VI
L.Ad (0W1) Gul) (4.$. (7.8.93 (.11.13) (13 W
D 97-108 97-121 109-133 121-151 140-173 131-1U
10 97-121 108-133 121-151 13 -5U 131-In 169-210
31 10I-135 121-131 135-10 153-lU 16.210 IUm- s
32 121-151 135-16 151-I01 161-210 IM8-23 210-262
33 135-16 131-1U 168-210 IN-233 210-262 235-293
34 151-l88 168-210 11-233 210-262 233-293 M-327
3 16-210 181-235 210-262 235-293 262-427 292-365
36 18-235 210-262 233-2 262-327 292-363 324-403
37 210-262 235.293 262-527 292-M36 324-405 360-htf
38 235-293 262-327 292-3M5 32440 160-li. 360-lit.
39 262-327 292-363 324-403 360-li& 360-it. 360-lH&.
40 292-363 324-403 360-lit 360 360-lit 360-it.
41 32-405 360-lit. 3O-lit. 366-lit. 360-lit. 360-lit
a 360-lit. 360-lit. 36-it 360-lit 360-liM . 360-lit
lit, lit l lie lit lit.
2. THE HORIZONTAL AXIS-"CRIMINAL HISTORY"
The criminal history calculation is a rough effort to determine the
defendant's disposition to criminality, as reflected in his prior contacts
with the criminal law. The basic unit of measurement in this calculation
is prior sentences imposed for misdemeanors and felonies." Each such
incident is worth a certain number of "criminal history points." These
points are added, and the result will fall within one of six "Criminal
History Categories." The more criminal history points, the higher the
criminal history category, the longer the resulting sentence. The
rationales for considering this sort of information are three:
1) Incapacitation. Those subscribing to this rationale
hold that prior criminal conduct is predictive of
recidivism. Therefore, imposing a longer sentence
may be appropriate to incapacitate the defendant and
59. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 4 Pt. A (1995) for rules regarding calculation of the
criminal history category. In addition to prior misdemeanor and felony sentences, a
defendant can receive criminal history points on other grounds. For example, a defendant
earns criminal history points if he committed the instant offense while on probation or
parole, § 4A1 .1 (d), or within a specified period following release from another sentence,
§ 4Al.l(e).
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so prevent a number of the crimes he would commit
if at liberty.?
2) Deterrence. One who has offended in the past and
has been punished, or at least been made acutely
aware of the prospect of punishment, may require a
longer sentence to achieve deterrence than would a
first time offender. 6'
3) Blameworthiness. Those familiar with capital
sentencing litigation will be familiar with the position
that one who has been through the criminal process
before, who previously has been made personally and
painfully aware of society's disapproval of criminal
conduct, is thought to be more blameworthy when he
reoffends and thus more deserving of greater
punishment.62
3. THE VERTICAL AXIS-"OFFENSE LEVEL"
The offense level is a measurement of the seriousness of the present
crime. In general, the Guidelines accomplish this measurement in the
following way: The calculation begins with the crime of which the
defendant was actually convicted. The court must determine, primarily
by reference to the "Statutory Index,"' which guideline in Chapter
60. U.S.S.G. Ch. 4 Pt. A (intro. comment) ("To protect the public from further
crimes of the particular defendant, the likelihood of recidivism and future criminal
behavior must be considered.").
61. Id. (intro. comment) ("General deterrence of criminal conduct dictates that
a clear message be sent to society that repeated criminal behavior will aggravate the need
for punishment with each recurrence.").
62. Id. (intro. comment) ("A defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior
is more culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of greater punishment.").
In the capital sentencing context, the Supreme Court has emphasized on a number
of occasions that a defendant's eligibility for the ultimate penalty of death turns in large
measure on his individual blameworthiness. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808, 825 (1991) (affirming that individual blameworthiness is a central factor in the
capital sentencing calculus, and permitting the introduction of victim impact evidence as
relevant to the jury's assessment of "the defendant's moral culpability and
blameworthiness"); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496,504 (1987) (holding that individual
blameworthiness is the core inquiry in capital sentencing but excluding victim impact
evidence as irrelevant to blameworthiness). Previous contacts with the criminal law have
been held relevant to the determination of blameworthiness in capital cases. See, e.g.,
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 888 (1983).
63. U.S.S.G. app. A (1995).
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Two, "Offense Conduct," applies to that crime. Although the Guidelines
are a modified real offense sentencing system, the "jumping-off point" for
Guidelines calculations remains the crime of conviction. In order to
illustrate the following discussion, the guideline for theft, embezzlement,
and other similar property crimes, section 2B 1.1, is reproduced below as
Table 2:
TABLE 2"
§ 2B1.1. Larceny. Embezzlenent. and Other Forms of Theft: Receivinu.
Trnsporting. Transferring. Transmitting. or Possessine Stolenl'ro ,ert
(a) Base Offense Level: 4
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) If the loss exceeded $100, increase the offense level as follows:
Loss (Apply the Greatest) Increase in Level
(A) $100 or less no increase
(B) More than $100 add 1
(C) More than $1,000 add 2
(D) More than $2,000 add 3
(E) More than $5,000 add 4
(F) More than $10,000 add 5
(G) More than $20,000 add 6
(H) More than $40,000 add 7
(I) More than $70,000 add 8
(J) More than $120,000 add 9
(K) More than $200,000 add 10
(L) More than $350,000 add 11
(M) More than $500,000 add 12
(N) More than $800,000 add 13
(0) More than $1,500,000 add 14
(P) More than $2,500,000 add 15
(Q) More than $5,000,000 add 16
(R) More than $10,000,000 add 17
(S) More than $20,000,000 add 18
(T) More than $40,000,000 add 19
(U) More than $80,000,000 add 20
(2) If the theft was from the person of another, increase by 2 levels.
64. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (reproduced here but omitting subsection (c) concerning
cross-references).
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(3) If (A) undelivered United States mail was taken, or the taking of
such item was an object of the offense; or (B) the stolen property
received, transported, transferred, transmitted, or possessed was
undelivered United States mail, and the offense level as
determined above is less than level 6, increase to level 6.
(4) (A) If the offense involved more than minimal planning,
increase by 2 levels; or
(B) If the offense involved receiving stolen property, and the
defendant was a person in the business of receiving and
selling stolen property, increase by 4 levels.
(5) If the offense involved an organized scheme to steal vehicles or
vehicle parts, and the offense level as determined above is less
than level 14, increase to level 14.
(6) If the offense-
(A) substantially jeopardized the safety and soundness of a
financial institution; or
(B) affected a financial institution and the defendant derived
more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from the offense,
increase by 4 levels. If the resulting offense level is less
than level 24, increase to level 24.
Most Chapter Two offense conduct guidelines contain two basic
components: A "base offense level" and a set of "specific offense
characteristics." The base offense level is a seriousness ranking
determined solely by the fact of conviction of a particular crime. The
specific offense characteristics are an effort to categorize and account for
commonly occurring factors which cause one crime to be viewed as worse
than another. These characteristics "customize" the crime. For example,
the Guidelines differentiate between a theft of $1,000 and a theft of
$1,000,000,' as well as between a bank robbery where the robber hands
the teller a note, and a robbery where the robber pistol whips the teller
and shoots the bank guard.' This customizing of the sentence by
reference to factors not included in the elements of the crime of
conviction is one way in which the Guidelines move in the direction of
"real offense" sentencing.
65. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) (reflecting an increaseof two offense levels for a theft
of $1000, and an increase of thirteen offense levels for a theft of $1,000,000).
66. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b) (reflecting possible increases of up to eleven offense
levels for the use of a weapon and causing injuries in the course of a robbery).
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The base offense level for all theft crimes is 4.67 If a defendant
stole $1,000,000, the court would consider the "specific offense
characteristic" of the "loss," and would add another 13 offense levels."
If the $1,000,000 were stolen from another person, the court would add
two more offense levels.' Thus, a million-dollar purse snatch or
jewelry grab would yield a total Chapter Two offense level of
4+13+2=19.
After determining an offense level by applying the offense conduct
guidelines from Chapter Two, the court must consider a series of
adjustments contained in Chapter Three. These adjustments depend on
the circumstances of each case and include increases in the offense level
based on factors such as the defendant's role in the offense,7 whether
the defendant obstructed justice,71 whether the offense was committed
against a government official" or a particularly vulnerable victim,"
and whether there are multiple counts of conviction.7' Reductions in the
offense level are also possible, based on the defendant's "mitigating role"
in the offense or on the defendant's so-called "acceptance of
responsibility."7
67. U.S.S.G. § 2BL.l(a).
68. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.l(b)(1)(N).
69. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.l(b)(2).
70. U.S.S.G. §3Bl.1. The defendant's offense level can be enhanced by either
2, 3, or 4 levels depending on the degree of control he exercised over the criminal
enterprise and on the size of that enterprise.
71. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (cmt. n.3). "Obstruction of justice includes conduct such
as threatening witnesses, suborning pejury, producing counterfeit exculpatory documents,
destroying evidence, and failing to appear as ordered for trial." Id.
72. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2.
73. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.l (providing for an offense level enhancement when the
defendant selects a victim based on "race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
gender, disability, or sexual orientation" or selects a victim "unusually vulnerable due to
age, physical or mental condition").
74. U.S.S.G. Ch. 3 Pt. D.
75. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 (providing for a reduction of two or four offense levels
when the defendant is found to be a "minor participant" or "minimal participant" in the
criminal activity).
76. U.S.S.G. § 3E1. lb (providing for a reduction of two offense levels when the
defendant "clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility," and three offense levels if
the otherwise applicable offense level is at least 16 and the defendant has "assisted
authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct"). Despite the
euphemism "acceptance of responsibility," § 3El.1 is nothing more than an
institutionalized incentive for guilty pleas.
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4. CALCULATION OF THE SENTENCE
Once the court calculates the offense level on the vertical axis and
the criminal history category on the horizontal axis, it can determine the
sentencing range. The judge retains largely unfettered discretion to
sentence within that range." A judge may "depart" by going above or
below the range, but only if the judge can explain the reasoning behind
the departure in terms of factors for which the Guidelines do not
adequately account.' Moreover, except in the most unusual
circumstances, the Guidelines specifically exclude from consideration
most of the factors which judges formerly used to "individualize"
sentences,7 such as age,' educational and vocational skills,"' mental
77. U.S.S.G. § SCL.I(A) ("A sentence conforms with the guidelines for
imprisonment if it is within the minimum and maximum terms of the applicable guideline
range."). There is some modest limitation on a court's discretionary power to sentence
within a range. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) (1994), if a sentence falls within a
range which exceeds 24 months, the court must provide a statement of reasons for its
imposition of the particular sentence.
78. The Guidelines' enabling legislation mandates that "[tihe court shall impose
a sentence of the kind, and within the range [resulting from application of the Guidelines]
unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind,
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different than that described [by
the Guidelinesl." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). This statutory language is repeated in the "policy
statement" describing the grounds for departure contained in the Guidelines themselves.
See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (1995).
79. Chapter 5, Part H of the Guidelines contains a lengthy list of factors that the
Commission determined to be "not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a
sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range." U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 Pt. H. In
theory, most of these factors nonetheless can justify a departure from the applicable range,
but such a departure is permissible only where the excluded factor is present to a degree
so unusual that the Commission would not have anticipated its impact and thus did not
"adequately [take it] into consideration," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), when formulating the
Guidelines. The exclusion of these factors from the departure calculus stems largely from
the Commission's reading of 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (1994), which required that "the
guidelines and policy statements [regarding a sentence of imprisonment] reflect the
inappropriateness of considering the education, vocational skills, employment record,
family ties and responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant." For a description
of the statutory basis and genesis of Chapter 5, Part H, see Stith & Koh, supra note 7,
at 249-51. Professor Daniel J. Freed comments that, "Perhaps no provisions in the
guidelines evoke more dismay from the federal judiciary, the probation service, and the
bar than the policy statements assembled in Chapter 5H." Daniel J. Freed, Federal
Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of
Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1715 (1992).
Judge Stewart Dalzell of the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania says that the Chapter 5H policy statements "perhaps more than any other
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and emotional conditions," physical condition," history of substance
abuse," employment record,' family or community ties," socio-
economic status," military record,"8 history of charitable good
works" and "lack of guidance as a youth."'
The importance of specifically-delineated facts in determining the
offense level highlights another striking difference between the Guidelines
and what came before. In former days, all information came in at
sentencing and courts could consider it, but they did not have to, 1 and
they never had to explain the reasoning behind the sentence. Under the
Guidelines, however, the facts of the case and the defendant's past history
govern the defendant's placement on both the horizontal and vertical axes
of the sentencing grid. The prosecution must prove those facts not
beyond a reasonable doubt, but still to a preponderance of the
evidence.' Therefore, unlike pre-Guidelines sentencing, every
sentencing hearing is evidentiary in character. The court must make
[guideline provision), seem to me to be at the heart of the judiciary's antipathy" to the
guidelines. Dalzell, supra note 52, at 332. He concludes, however, that to allow
consideration of the Chapter 5H factors risks destroying the neutrality of sentencing and
may produce "sentencing disparities that impermissibly correlate with statuses such as
race." Id. For a discussion of the desirability of considering the individualizing factors
ordinarily excluded by Chapter 5H, see infra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
80. U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.1 (1995).
81. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.2. (providing that educational or vocational skills may be
relevant to enhance a defendant's sentence if he used some special skill to further his
criminal activity).
82. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3.
83. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4.
84. id.
85. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.5.
86. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6.
87. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10.
88. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.l1.
89. id.
90. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.12.
91. Describing federal sentencing as it existed in 1977, Hoffman and Stone-
Meierhoefer observed that, "Whether factors relating [tol the circumstances of the present
offense, the defendant's prior record, social background, attitude or remorse, or type of
plea are given primary weight, some weight, or no weight at all is left totally to the
discretion of the individual sentencing judge." Hoffman &Stone-Meierhoefer, supra note
27, at 56.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Salmon, 948 F.2d 776, 778-79 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(holding that the burden of proof as to a fact upon which a party seeks to rely at
sentencing is a preponderance of the evidence); United States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d 1330,
1330 (7th Cir. 1990) (similarly holding that the burden of proof at sentencing is a
preponderance of the evidence); United States v. Alfaro, 919 F.2d 962, 965 (5th Cir.
1990) (holding the same).
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findings of fact.m Both the defendant and the government now have the
right to appeal a sentence with which they disagree.'
5. RELEVANT CONDUCT
The system described so far seemingly constrains judges rather
effectively. Only the seriousness of the offense and the criminal history
are relevant to the sentencing range. A judge cannot punish or reward
defendants just because he does or does not like the cut of their jibs.
Judges can indulge their own idiosyncratic theories of penology only
within the narrowly circumscribed limits of the applicable Guideline
range. A sentencing court must consider evidence, make findings of fact,
and explain its decisions. District court judges cannot depart very often,
and the bases for departure are limited. When judges decide to depart,
they are obliged to carefully explain that choice.
Still, if treating similarly-situated defendants similarly is a primary
objective of the Guidelines system, at least one glaring loophole remains
in the system I have described so far: To the extent that a sentencing
system limits the facts fed into the Guidelines calculation to those
involving the count of conviction, it reduces the sentencing discretion of
judges and confers upon the parties, notably the prosecutor, increased
power to control sentences through charging decisions and plea bargains.
Consider a hypothetical drug case. Imagine twin brothers, both of
whom chose drug dealing as a career. One lives in Lexington, Virginia,
in the Western District of Virginia, and the other in Alexandria, Virginia,
in the Eastern District of Virginia. Assume that last Sunday each brother
bought five kilograms of cocaine, and then each sold a kilogram of
cocaine every day, Monday through Friday. If the DEA catches both
brothers, the local federal prosecutors in their different districts can
charge the twins with all or any combination of five drug sales. In drug
93. "The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for
its imposition of the particular sentence" and must specifically justify any sentence outside
the Guidelines range, or any sentence within that range if the range exceeds 24 months.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1994). The last provision is best understood by examining the
sentencing grid. Some sentencing ranges on the grid have maximum sentences as little
as six months longer than the minimum for that range; other ranges at the high end of the
grid set maximum sentences as much as 81 months longer than their minimum. The
statute requires that when a range determined by Guidelines calculations is 24 months or
greater, the sentencing judge must state his or her reasons for choosing the sentence
within the range. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 977 F.2d 1227, 1228 (8th Cir. 1992)
(remanding to district court for failure to resolve disputed issue of fact and place on
record the resolution); see also United States v. Rosado-Ubiera, 947 F.2d 644, 646 (2d
Cir. 1991); United States v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156, 158 (8th Cir. 1990).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1994).
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cases sentenced under the Guidelines, drug quantity almost entirely
determines sentence length." If Brother A, who lives in Lexington,
encounters a prosecutor who is a bit of a softy and offers to let him plead
guilty to only one count of possession with intent to distribute for the sale
on Monday, and if the Guidelines do not require the sentencing judge to
consider what Brother A did Tuesday through Thursday, he will receive
a sentence of a little over five years.' If Brother B encounters a
tougher prosecutor in the Eastern District of Virginia, or has a lousy
defense lawyer, and the prosecutor indicts and convicts him for all five
days' sales, then under any system he will be held responsible for the
week's total cocaine sales and will receive a sentence of at least ten
years.' Hence, because of the differential exercise of discretion by two
prosecutors, Brother A receives one-half of his twin's sentence for
committing exactly the same crimes.
The Sentencing Commission was unwilling to confer upon
prosecutors the unbridled discretion it was trying to divest from judges,
so it created "relevant conduct.""' Exploration of the nuances of
"relevant conduct" is beyond the scope of this presentation, but the
essence of the concept is that the court can, indeed must, sentence each
defendant based on what he really did in the same transaction or series of
related transactions that resulted in the count of conviction, regardless of
the specific offense of which the defendant is convicted after trial or as
a result of a plea. In the case of the drug dealing twins, the relevant
conduct guideline requires the judge to sentence both brothers for all five
kilograms.
When taken together, the relevant conduct concept, the customization
of sentences through "specific offense characteristics," and the rules
governing sentences for multiple counts of conviction transformed what
would otherwise have been a predominantly "charge of conviction"
system into a "modified real offense" system. 9
95. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (1995).
96. This hypothetical sentence is based on an offense level of 26, U.S.S.G. §
2D1.l(c)(7), and a criminal history score of 1, U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. See supra Table I and
text accompanying note 57.
97. Brother B's sentence is based on an offense level of 32, U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1(c)(4), and a criminal history score of 1, U.S.S.G. § 4A 1.1. See supra Table 1 and
text accompanying note 57.
98. The term "relevant conduct" and its applications to Guidelines calculations
are explained in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. For a general discussion of relevant conduct and its
function in the Guidelines system, see William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant
Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495
(1990).
99. See, e.g., Daniel J. Sears, Defense Practice Under the Bail Reform Act and
the Sentencing Guidelines-A Shifting Focus, 55 FED. PROBATION 38, 40 (1991)
1996:679
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Compared with the system they replaced, the Guidelines are a whole
new world. Where before the object was to do individualized justice,
now there is a plethora of rules designed to ensure that similarly-situated
defendants receive the same or very similar sentences. In the new world
of Guidelines sentencing, similarity is defined on only two grounds: (1)
the seriousness of the present "real offense;" and (2) the extent and
seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct. Just as was the case
pre-Guidelines, judges may still receive and consider information about
the defendant's unique personality, background, and circumstances. With
rare exceptions, however, judges may consider such factors only in
setting a sentence within the ultimately determined range on the grid.
In short, we have traveled from a regime which sought to personalize
the sentence to the criminal to a system with the objective espoused by the
Lord High Executioner in The Mikado:
My object all sublime,
I shall achieve in time:
To let the punishment fit the crime,
the punishment fit the crime."
III. THE GUIDELINES MEET JUDGE CABRANES AND FRIENDS
Having described, at least in broad strokes, what the Guidelines are
and what they do, is Judge Cabranes right? Are they a "dismal failure?"
In this section, I examine several of the principal criticisms of the
Guidelines system to see if they withstand scrutiny.
A. God From the Machine
The first and most commonly heard complaint about the Guidelines
is that they are mechanistic, soulless, and inhuman. 0 ' To quote Judge
Cabranes, they "ignore individual characteristics of defendants and
sacrifice comprehensibility and common sense on the altar of
pseudoscientific uniformity."" This complaint really has two
(categorizing the sentencing process under the Guidelines as one based on "'real offense'
behavior rather than the offense of conviction"). But see Standen, supra note 29, at 1505-
12 (asserting that the Guidelines are actually a charged offense system).
100. W.S. GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, The Mikado, in THE COMPLETE
PLAYS OF GILBERT AND SULLIVAN 343, 352 (1938).
101. See, e.g., Tonry, supra note 52, at 358 (referring to the Guidelines
Sentencing Table as a "43-Level 'Sentencing Machine'"); Stith & Koh, spra note 7, at
289 (referring to the "severe, elaborate, and unwieldy guidelines").
102. Cabranes, supra note 2, at A11.
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components: first, that the Guidelines are too complex to be
comprehensible; and second, that they are too rigid and fail to take into
account the individual characteristics of particular defendants."m Let me
address the two strands in order.
1. COMPLEXITY
When considering the indictment against the Guidelines for excessive
complexity, the first question is: To whom do they seem too complex?
Although prosecutors, defense counsel and judges often bewail the
Guidelines' manifold complexities, °4 the truth is that most of these
complaints are just the pro forma bellyaching of lawyers in any field who
are faced with the unavoidable task of mastering a moderately complicated
statute or regulation. In fact, the Guidelines are no more complicated
than comparable bodies of law in other fields, or indeed within criminal
law itself. By comparison to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the
area of double jeopardy," or any small corner of the Internal Revenue
103. For other critiques focusing on the Guidelines' failure to consider individual
characteristics as grounds for departure, see Thomas W. Hillier, II, The Commission's
Departure from an Evolutionary Amendment Process, 4 FED. SENT. REP. 45, (1991)
(discussing the Commission's efforts to limit consideration of individual factors); Jeff
Staniels, Opportunities for Courts and Advocates Under the 1992 Amendments, 4 FED.
SENT. REP. 314, 314-15 (1992) (criticizing the "Commission's restrictive view of the
relevance of an offender's background and personal circumstances to an appropriate
sentence").
104. Judge Cabranes calls the Guidelines "a byzantine system of rules."
Cabranes, supra note 2, at Al1. Gerald Uelmen writes that "[t]he problem of sentencing
disparity is not unique to the federal criminal justice system [but] [o]nly the federal system
has produced a solution which outweighs the Manhattan telephone directory . ... "
Gerald Uelmen, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Cure Worse Than the Disease, 29 AM.
CRiM. L. REv. 899, 902 (1992); see also Marc Miller, Rehabilitating the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 78 JUDICATURE 180 (1995).
105. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's application of the double
jeopardy standard to the law of forfeiture, beginning with the 1931 case Various Items of
Personal Property v. United States, in which the Court held that in rem civil forfeitures
are not punishment for purposes of the constitutional bar against double jeopardy. 282
U.S. 577 (1931). This decision was followed by Halper v. United States, 490 U.S. 435
(1989), holding that inpersonam civil penalties constitute punishment for double jeopardy
purposes, and Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993), holding that in rem civil
forfeitures are punishment under the Eighth Amendment excessive fines clause. Montana
Dept. of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994), holding that a state tax on illegal
drugs is punishment under the double jeopardy clause, was decided just one year later.
This line of cases culminates with the Court's recent change of heart in United States v.
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996), in which the Court held that civil in rem forfeitures do
not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes. In so holding, the Court
distinguished all language in Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch which held or plainly
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Code, the Guidelines are a model of limpid clarity.
Moreover, despite expressions of distress about the size of the
Guidelines Manual, most cases sentenced under the Guidelines are
governed by very few provisions. To take the most obvious example,
approximately forty percent of all federal sentences result from narcotics
convictions. 1" Drug cases are sentenced under the provisions of
Chapter Two, Part D, of the Guidelines Manual. These provisions take
up only thirty-seven pages, and practitioners in the drug area become
extraordinarily familiar with them through repetition.1" The Guidelines
are simply not that hard for any lawyer of modest competence to
understand or apply.
A more superficially appealing count of the undue complexity
indictment is the concern that defendants cannot understand the law under
which judges sentence them. Judge Cabranes has said, "Nothing is more
disconcerting to me as a District Judge than to watch a defendant and his
family and others sitting in a courtroom, literally bewildered by 30 to 60
minutes of conversations about matrices, computations, adding, deducting,
excluding, including, departing, not departing. This is not justice...
"108
This is not a frivolous concern. Defendants should understand why
they are being locked away in a cell, and should be able to grasp the
reasons advanced by the sentencing authority for the length of their stay.
Yet it is hard to conclude that defendants today are less well-informed
about their probable fate and reasons for it than they would have been
before 1987. Defendants today, if competently represented, will have
reviewed with their counsel the pre-sentence report and the applicable
Guidelines calculation before sentencing ever begins. If there is one
spectacle less illuminating than the intricacies of a Guidelines argument,
it is that of a judge in an indeterminate system sitting in sphinx-like
silence through a sentencing and then proclaiming, "In consideration of
all the factors presented before me here today, I sentence you to forty-
seven months. Thank you. We will be in recess." The workings of the
implied that civil forfeitures are punishment.
106. U.S. SENTENCINO COMM'N 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 55 [hereinafter 1993
ANNUAL REPORT].
107. U.S.S.G. Ch. 2 Pt. D (1995). Of course, even those who specialize in drug
cases must be familiar with other parts of the Manual such as the sections on relevant
conduct, role adjustments and criminal history. U.S.S.G. §§ 1BI.3, 3B, and ch. 4. The
point remains, however, that to the average lawyer practicing in federal criminal cases,
large swathes of the Guidelines will remain terra incognita without prejudice either to the
government or to any individual client.
108. Proceedings of the Fiffy-First Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia
Circuit, 134 F.R.D. 321, 475 (1990) (statement of Judge Jos6 A. Cabranes).
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Guidelines are complicated, but at least they are visible. Moreover, I
think Judge Cabranes underestimates the acuity of those who have
appeared before him. In my experience, defendants may not be able to
get their arms around the sweeping principles of guidelines theory, but
they grasp the essentials as applied to themselves with surprising rapidity.
2. RIGIDrrY
To assess the complaint that the Guidelines take insufficient account
of the individual characteristics of criminal defendants, consider two
cases:
CASE #1: An Hispanic male, age twenty-one. Born in Mexico.
Brought to this country by his single mother when he was five years old
and abandoned by her at age ten when she became addicted to heroin.
Raised thereafter by his grandmother. Intelligent, but never finished high
school. Involved with gangs from his early teens onward. Several arrests
and adjudications for car theft and relatively minor muggings while a
juvenile. Brought to federal court for sentencing because he and some
friends ran an operation in which they stole credit cards from the mail and
ran up unauthorized charges totaling more than nine million dollars.
CASE #2: A white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant, nay Episcopalian,
male. Fifty years old. Married. Three children. Vice-president of the
First National Bank, and long-time vestryman of the St. Aloisius
Memorial Church. Member of the Rotary and Kiwanis. Frequent
contributor to charitable causes. Volunteer youth soccer coach. All
around good guy. Making his first appearance in a judicial setting
because he made one trifling error of judgment-over the last five years,
he embezzled nine million dollars from his employer.
What does it mean to say in these cases, and the thousands like them
that pass through federal courts each year, that the sentences should be
"individualized"? Before the Guidelines, the "individualized sentencings"
in these cases would have gone something like this:
In the case of the Latino credit card thief, his lawyer would have
argued that the defendant's age, minority status, troubled childhood, and
"lack of youthful guidance" mitigated the seriousness of his offense, and
thus that the sentence should be low. The prosecutor, by contrast, would
have argued that the defendant's age, tenuous ties to this country, unstable
childhood, and history of juvenile delinquency made it probable that the
defendant would offend again, and thus that the sentence should be high.
In the case of the embezzling pillar of the community, his lawyer
would have pointed to his age, his lack of prior record, his previously
unblemished professional career, his exemplary family life, his piety, and
his record of service to the community. The lawyer would have claimed
that the defendant was suffering enough from the mere fact of a
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conviction. He would contend that there was virtually no likelihood of
recidivism, and argue for a low probationary sentence. The prosecutor,
for his part, would have pointed to exactly the same factors-age, family
support, membership in a religious community, professional success, and
community status-to argue that the defendant was motivated purely by
greed. He would insist that a person with so many advantages had no
excuse for so profound a breach of trust, and he would urge that the
defendant's conduct merited a particularly severe sentence.
Before the Guidelines, the sentence ultimately meted out to the
Latino thief or the Anglo embezzler depended entirely on the world view
of the particular judge to whom these arguments were addressed.1" If
the judge thought that youth and adversity merited a second chance:
probation. If the judge thought the same factors merely predicted future
dangerousness: prison. If the judge looked at the banker and thought,
"There, but for the grace of God, go I:" probation. If another judge
looked at same banker and thought of betrayal and greed: prison.
The difficulty here is not merely that trying to individualize sentences
inevitably results in disparity. One could, under the Guidelines, limit that
disparity to some degree by assigning positive or negative values to the
factors mentioned above and attempt to control the uses judges made of
them.110 The real problem is that all of the arguments I have placed in
the mouths of the defenders and prosecutors of my hypothetical
defendants are "true." Youth, poverty, and family breakdown can all
contribute to underdeveloped moral sensibilities and powers of self-
control, and a young person without the advantage of these qualities feels
less culpable to us. But one need not be a theologian or a saint to
recognize that stealing nine million dollars is profoundly wrong.
Moreover, the very developmental deficiencies that seem to excuse the
youthful and impoverished offender also, and undeniably, increase the
threat he will reoffend.
As for the upper middle class embezzler, he probably presents less
of a future threat to society than the youthful gang member. But the
betrayal of the social contract by a banker who has benefitted from that
contract so long is hugely greater than that of a boy whom society barely
acknowledged at all.
For every defendant there are both excuses for his conduct and
reasons why, in his case, the conduct is especially disappointing and
109. "The reasons for the sentencing patterns in many courts have little or nothing
to do with achieving some general social objective, but a great deal to do with the
immediate problems and idiosyncratic beliefs of the judges." WILSON, supra note 16, at
166.
110. Of course, attempting to quantify even more factors within the Guidelines
structure would make it correspondingly more complex.
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blameworthy. Society, through the legislature and the courts, can
determine, at least to a good approximation, how seriously it views
various categories of criminal conduct and the harm that conduct causes
or risks. It can embody its judgments in a scale of punishments for
categories of criminal conduct. Society can also decide a priori that
certain personal characteristics excuse or mitigate criminal culpability,
such as, for example, insanity or diminished mental capacity. What
society cannot do when setting the sentence for each prisoner, however,
is perform a completely individualized moral calculus. The variables are
too many. Our powers of understanding other human souls are too
limited.
One of the recurring criticisms of the Guidelines is that they are too
ambitious, that they attempt to factor too many considerations into written
instructions for a chart. Judge Cabranes dismissively refers to them as a
"utopian experiment."' There is, of course, some merit to this claim.
The Guidelines could be simpler, could try to subdivide offense conduct
into fewer categories. Nonetheless, the true tribunes of hubris are those
who yearn for former days and claim that the exercise of unfettered
sentencing discretion by district court judges was, as Judge Cabranes
maintains, never a "major or irreparable weakness of the federal courts
system-it was one of its strengths."" 2  Judge Cabranes' position
inescapably rests on a claim that the judiciary possesses a unique
competence in achieving the right individualized sentence"' by, as he
says (in counterpoint to the Lord High Executioner), "mak[ing] sure that
111. Jos6 A. Cabranes, A Failed Utopian Experiment, NAT'L L.J., July 27, 1992,
at 17.
112. Cabranes, supra note 1, at 2.
113. For example, in 1992, Judges Cabranes wrote:
Our system is a human institution, and since biblical times we have
assumed that the quintessential duty of a judge in a criminal case is to
exercise judgement in sentencing, to make sure that the punishment fits the
crime and also that the punishment fits the criminal. The exercise of
discretion by a federal judge at sentencing was not, in my view, ever a
major or irreparable weakness of the federal courts system-it was one of
its strengths.
Cabranes, supra note 1, at 2 (emphasis added).
I do not think this passage can fairly be construed as anything other than a claim of
special judicial competence in sentencing, a claim buttressed by appeals to antiquity and
even, by allusion, to religious tradition. Moreover, a claim of special judicial competence
in sentencing is unmistakably implied by Judge Cabranes' consistent advocacy of a return
to the pre-Guidelines regime of unfettered judicial sentencing discretion. Judge Cabranes
has proposed modifying the pre-Guidelines system by installing some form of appellate
review of sentences, Cabranes, supra note 1, at 2, but that proposal seems, if anything,
to be another expression of faith in the peculiar competence of judges to sentence.
1996:679
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the punishment fits the crime and also that the punishment fits the
criminal." 14
The flaw in the claim that judges have unique insight into the choice
of individualized sentences lies in the assertion unmistakably implicit in
such a claim that the individualized sentence is the right sentence, or at
least a sentence that is more likely to be right than a sentence imposed by
any other means. Indeed, the flaw lies in the very notion of a "right
sentence." On the one hand, choosing the right sentence could mean
choosing the correct sentence, the efficacious sentence, but that can only
mean that we are thinking of a sentence as a prescription designed to
achieve a result. That desired result presumably is rehabilitation, or at
least, the prevention of recidivism. The idea of the right individualized
sentence in this sense is thus exposed as only a disguised version of the
claims of the rehabilitationists-judges have the wisdom to prescribe the
correct dose of bitter medicine. 115 But if we have learned anything at
all in the last century, it is that neither judges nor anyone else have the
keys to the medicine cabinet of the soul."6
114. Cabranes, supra note 1, at 2. Judge Cabranes echoes, perhaps
unconsciously, the language of Justice Black in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
(1949). Justice Black referred to "a prevalent modem philosophy that the punishment
should fit the offender and not merely the crime." Id. at 247. Despite the Court's
embrace of the philosophy of individualized sentencing in Wi//iams, it was clear even
before the advent of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that no constitutional right to an
individualized sentence exists. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978).
115. Consider the following passage from Professor Daniel J. Freed, a prominent
academic critic of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 'Each ease involves unique
offenders and offense circumstances, and their underlying stories-of need or greed, of
recklessness or malice, in mitigation or aggravation-need to be assessed and sentenced
by experienced professionals exercising human judgment. Numerical 'offense levels' are
useful in launching the sentencing process, but they are woefully unreliable as substitutes
for judges." Freed, supra note 79, at 1705. Professor Freed is a knowledgeable and
perceptive observer, but it is difficult to escape the conclusion that his critique flows
primarily from a basic hostility toward determinate sentencing and a lingering romance
with the idea of judges as supercompetent professional therapists.
116. As early as 1969, Leslie T. Wilkins concluded that "the major achievement
of research in the field of social pathology and treatment has been negative and has
resulted in the undermining of nearly all the current mythology regarding effectiveness
of treatment in any form." LESLIE T. WnuiNs, EVALUATION OF PENAL MEAsURES 78
(1969). When Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, it concluded: "We
know too little about human behavior to be able to rehabilitate individuals on a routine
basis or even to determine accurately whether or when a particular prisoner has been
rehabilitated." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1984) reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3223; see also CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE,
CRIMINAL JusTICE 372-74 (1978) (expressing skepticism about the rehabilitative efficacy
of the penal system); WILSON, supra note 16, at 162-67 (summarizing studies of prison
treatment programs and concluding that the "evidence supporting the efficacy of
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On the other hand, if choosing the right individualized sentence does
not mean choosing the correct therapeutic sentence," 7 then it must mean
choosing the uniquely just sentence11-the one sentence which
represents the optimum deserved response to a particular act resulting in
particular harms performed by a unique human being at a particular
moment in his life's journey. Judgments of that kind are best left to
God." '9 To do otherwise asks too much of judges and of human justice.
The true "utopian experiment" was indeterminate sentencing. That
utopianism is apparent in the system's inescapable dual claims. The first
of these is that a single human judge can make rational and consistent
choices that take account not only of the many factors the Guidelines
notoriously include, but also of all the factors the Guidelines wisely
exclude (at least from the calculation of the final Guideline range)."20
correctional treatment is slight, inconsistent and of questionable reliability").
117. "Twentieth-century expressions of the rehabilitative ideal, for example, may
be seen as part of a modem faith in therapeutic interventions, often with purposes
extending far beyond penological treatment and encompassing the health and happiness
of society generally." ALLEN, supra note 15, at 5.
118. In discussingjudicial responses to the Guidelines, Professor Freed makes this
telling remark: "When the gap between the guideline sentence and a just sentence is small,
most judges are likely to ... follow the guideline, for the norm of courts is to follow the
rules." Freed, supra note 79, at 1726 (emphasis added). This observation assumes, first,
that there is an objectively determinable "just" sentence which can, in turn, objectively
be determined to be different than the applicable guidelines sentence, and, second, that
judges are endowed with the ability to determine that "just" sentence.
119. 1 do not mean to suggest that endorsement of the Guidelines is possible only
for those confident of ultimate justice in heavenly courts, or that even the religious are
exempted from responsibility for ensuring that human justice is as close to the divine
variety as possible. The point is that "individualizing" criminal sentences to the degree
apparently envisioned by critics of the Guidelines appears to require both omniscience and
wisdom of nearly god-like dimensions.
120. For critiques of the Guidelines' exclusion from the offense level calculus of
various "individualizing" factors, see, e.g., Christina Chiafolo Montgomery, Social and
Schematic Injustice: The Treatment of Personal Offender Characteristics Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 NEw ENO. J. ON CRiM. & Civ. CoNFNmmENT 27
(1993); Myma S. Raeder, "Gender Neutral" Sentencing Wreaks Havoc in the Lives of
Women Offenders and Their Children, 8 CRIM. JUST. 20 (1993); Jean H. Shuttleworth,
Recent Development: Childhood Abuse as a Mitigating Factor in Federal Sentencing: The
Ninth Circuit Versus the United States Sentencing Commission, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1333
(1993); Karen R. Smith, U.S. v. Johnson: The Second Circuit Overcomes the Sentencing
Guidelines' Myopic View of "Not Ordinarily Relevant" Family Responsibilities of the
Criminal Offender, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 573 (1993); Susan E. Ellingstad, Note, The
Sentencing Guidelines: Downward Departures Based on a Defendant's Extraordinary
Family Ties and Responsibilities, 76 MmI. L. REv. 957 (1992); J. Gordon Seymor,
Comment, Downward Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Based on the
Defendant's Drug Rehabilitative Efforts, 59 U. CHi. L. REv. 837 (1992). But see Ilene
H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing System:
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The second claim is that the choices of a single judge will, with neither
central guidance nor collective consultation, be acceptably consistent with
the choices of hundreds of fellow judges making their solitary
decisions. 2 1
The point is not that the individual characteristics of individual
offenders are, or ought to be, wholly irrelevant to the determination of
criminal sentences. The real point is that because the conflicting
arguments that arise in every case about the meaning to be accorded
individual characteristics are all valid to one degree or another, or at the
least will be seen to be so by some judges and not by others, individual
characteristics cannot be the predominant factor in assigning the
punishment a defendant is obliged to suffer for his criminal acts. If on
sentencing day the individual is all, then compassion (or as is equally
likely, vengeance, bias, or pure caprice) is free to swallow justice.
The truth about the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a truth which
could be entirely missed if one listened only to the system's critics,"
Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders Under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 181, 221 (1994)
(contending that favorable treatment of female offenders existed before the Guidelines and
persists under the Guidelines).
121. Many critics of the Guidelines, Judge Cabranes among them, cite opposition
from federal judges in the years following the adoption of the Guidelines as proof of their
"failure." See, e.g., Cabranes, supra note 1, at 2 (suggesting that disapproval of the
guidelines among judges and others is "well nigh universal"); Freed, supra note 79, at
1752 ('The early reactions by district courts to the guidelines have made it clear that, with
respect to a number of significant issues, the Commission elected the wrong policies for
federal sentencing reform."). If judges had loved the Guidelines immediately, one would
be forced to question the reform's effectiveness. Pre-guidelines, federal judges were
doing what they thought best, what they believed was just. "One never encountered any
judges who doubted the fair and just and merciful character of their own sentences."
Frankel, supra note 41, at 2044. Any sentencing system that set out to force the judiciary
to make different choices was likely to be perceived by judges as compelling injustice.
To the extent the implementation of the Guidelines stemmed from a judgment that judicial
behavior needed to be changed, the discomfort of judges with the Guidelines was a
necessary (although by no means sufficient) indicator of their success.
Moreover, my own experience is that judges appointed since 1987 are much less
resistant to the Guidelines than their predecessors. Recently appointed judges may not
unanimously embrace the Guidelines, but many to whom I have spoken seem to welcome
the guidance afforded by a set of sentencing standards. See, e.g., FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, PLANNINO FOR THE FUTURE: RESULTS OF A 1992 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER
SURVEY OF UNITED STATES JUDoEs 37 (1994) (suggesting that the Guidelines enjoy a
higher level of approval among active judges than among senior judges); see also Dalzell,
supra note 52, at 334, in which the author, a federal district judge appointed in 1991,
concludes by paraphrasing Winston Churchill: "[The Sentencing Reform Act] has wrought
the worst sentencing system except for the rest."
122. See, e.g., TONRY, supra note 2, at 11 ('The commission has forbidden
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is that federal judges are not barred from setting criminal sentences based
on the individual characteristics of defendants. Judges may consider all
the factors which were appropriate before the advent of the Guidelines in
determining the sentence within the Guideline range. This is not a trivial
matter. As noted above, the top of every guideline range is twenty-five
percent higher than the bottom of the range." In effect, the Guidelines
say that seventy-five percent of each criminal sentence will be determined
by the severity of the current offense and the seriousness of the
defendant's prior criminal history, and twenty-five percent of the sentence
will rest on the sentencing judge's virtually unreviewable assessment of
individualized factors.
To put some flesh on the point, consider the cases of our hypothetical
middle-aged WASP bank embezzler and youthful Latino credit card thief,
each of whom stole nine million dollars. Under the Guidelines, the
sentencing range for the embezzler would be fifty-seven to seventy-one
months;" the range for the credit card thief would be forty-six to fifty-
seven months."z It of considerable importance to the embezzler that
the judge has unfettered control over fourteen months of his life, and it
matters a great deal to the credit card thief whether he gets out in less
than four years or has to stay caged for nearly five. The question Judge
Cabranes and other Guidelines critics must answer is why the
idiosyncratic judgments of a randomly selected judicial officer should ever
control more than twenty-five percent of any criminal defendant's
sentence.
The most likely response would be some variant of Professor Tonry's
assertion that, "Rigid sentencing laws . . . create unacceptable risks of
injustice because they make it impossible to take account of important
judges to take account of many considerations . . . that many judges (and most people)
believe to be ethically relevant in a just system.").
123. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
124. This sentencing range assumes a conviction for a fraud offense with a base
offense level of 20 (level 6 plus an additional 14 levels for a loss exceeding five million
dollars), U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.I(b)(1)(O) (1995); an increase of two levels for more than
minimal planning, U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.1(b)(2); an increase of four levels because the crime
affected a financial institution and the defendant derived "gross receipts" greater than one
million dollars, U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(6); and an increase of two levels for abuse of trust,
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, for a total offense level of 26. It further assumes that the defendant
pleads guilty promptly and receives a three-level reduction for "super" acceptance of
responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.
125. This sentencing range assumes a conviction for a fraud offense with a base
offense level of 20 (level 6 plus an additional 14 levels for a loss exceeding five million
dollars), U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(O); an increase of two levels for more than minimal
planning, U.S.S.G. § 2FL.1(b)(2); an increase of four levels for an aggravating role,
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a); and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility,
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.
1996:679
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differences between defendants." 1" The problem with this argument
is not merely that it mischaracterizes the Guidelines by suggesting that
they prohibit judges from considering individual characteristics at
sentencing. The central difficulty is that the argument assumes what it
should be trying to prove-that these "important differences" are not only
important to assigning penalties for crime, but that they are more
important than the factors the Guidelines make determinative of
sentencing ranges. The critics' position is that judges should be allowed
to decide that, for example, an impoverished and abusive childhood is
more important in setting a sentence than the severity of the defendant's
crime. The Guidelines do not say that judges cannot consider a bad
childhood. They can-in setting a sentence within the applicable range.
A judge, however, cannot use childhood deprivation to override the policy
decision that the defendant's conduct merits a particular minimum
punishment. The issue is not, as it is routinely misrepresented to be, the
exclusion of individualizing characteristics. The issue is the creation of
a hierarchy of sentencing values-offense severity first, prior criminal
history second, and personal characteristics third-with which the critics
disagree.
The most we have any right to ask of human justice is that the
punishment bear some rough rational relationship to the severity of the
offense, that judges impose roughly similar punishments with reasonable
consistency on those who commit similar crimes, and that there be some
room for flexibility to consider individual circumstances and truly unusual
cases. To the extent that the Guidelines have moved us measurably closer
to that modest ideal, and they have, we must score them a success.
B. "Disparity Is Worse Than Ever"
Which brings us to the next most common complaint, that the
Guidelines have not reduced disparity. Again, Judge Cabranes: "Even on
their own terms, the guidelines have failed .... [T]he guidelines have
126. ToNRY, supra note 2, at 7. Professor Tonry places this argument in the
mouths of a hypothetical group of time-traveling judges, but it is plainly representative of
his views. See, e.g., supra note 122. In fairness, it should also be noted that Professor
Tonry included among the "rigid sentencing laws" against which the argument is leveled
not only the Guidelines, but also minimum mandatory sentences. In general, I share
Professor Tonry's disapproval of minimum mandatory sentences because they often have
the dual effect of eliminating any meaningful range within which a sentencing judge can
give effect to individual factors, and of nullifying the power to depart outside the range
to accommodate truly unusual cases. I hasten to add, however, that minimum mandatory
sentences are unnecessary only if there exists a guideline system with a high degree of
judicial compliance.
714
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not eliminated-indeed, they have arguably exacerbated-the problem of
arbitrary disparities among sentences imposed for similar offenses."" 2
This is a terribly serious, indeed crippling, charge, if it is true. And it
is made over and over again by judges opposed to the Guidelines,"2'
members of the defense bar,' 2 and throughout academic literature on
the subject.1 °
I have read anguished speech after anguished speech and slogged
through indignant article after indignant article, and each time I come to
the inevitable passage which claims that the Guidelines have increased, or
at least failed to reduce, sentencing disparity, I look for any evidence in
support of the claim. I am still looking, because no such evidence exists.
The critics who make this claim either give no authority for it, or cite to
some earlier critic who, in his turn, made the claim with no supporting
evidence.
127. Jos6 A. Cabranes, Speech to University of Puerto Rico Law School, (Oct.
1993) in LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 11, 1994, at 17; see also Cabranes, supra note 1, at 2
("Indeed, disparity is not only alive and well, it is now probably more common than
before and certainly more hidden than before.").
128. See, e.g., Judge Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing:
No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161 (1991); William W. Schwartzer,
Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 4 FED. SENT. REP. 339, 341 (1991) ("The elimination
of disparities is a worthy objective but it has not been achieved."); cf U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF
THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE
OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING 107, tbl.
27 (1991) [hereinafter SENTENCINO COMM'N IMPACT REPORT]. In this survey of fifty
federal district court judges, twenty-five judges (50%) expressed the view that the
Guidelines decreased disparity. Id. Nine judges (18%) felt that the Guidelines had no
impact on disparity. Id. at 108, tbl. 28.
129. See, e.g., the comments of Federal Public Defenders Judy Clarke and
Thomas W. Hillier, II, infra note 131.
130. See, e.g., Freed, supra note 79, at 1683 n.2 (commenting on the level of
"informal noncompliance with the guidelines" and contending that it creates disparity);
Stith & Koh, supra note 7, at 287.
131. See, e.g., Stith & Koh, supra note 7, at 287. In this otherwise meticulously
researched and documented article, the authors assert in conclusion that, "We also believe
that unwarranted sentencing disparity is as great now as it was before the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, though perhaps more hidden from view." As authority, the
authors cite Judy Clarke, The Sentencing Guidelines: What a Mess, 55 FEDERAL
PROBATION 45 (1991); Judge Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing:
No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161 (1991) 164-65; Thomas W. Hillier, II,
The Sentencing Commission and Its Critics, 2 FED. SENT. REP. 224, 226 (1990); Stith
& Koh, supra note 7, at 287 n.399.
Ms. Clarke and Mr. Hillier are prominent members of the defense bar whose
opinions are certainly of value, but neither of them provides any evidence of guidelines
disparity beyond anecdotes or hypotheticals. For example, Ms. Clarke, the nationally-
respected Federal Public Defender for the Eastern District of Washington, claims the
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The somewhat troubling truth is that the actual evidence on the
question of the Guidelines' effect on disparity is scant. Only two
significant studies have ever been done. The U.S. Sentencing
Commission conducted a study in 1991 that concluded the Guidelines had
reduced disparity as compared to pre-Guidelines practice. 32 The
General Accounting Office did a study the next year"3 that criticized the
existence of "interpretive disparity," that is, differences in interpretations or applications
of the same or similar facts by judges and probation officers. Id. Three responses
suggest themselves: (1) She supports her claim for the existence of "interpretive disparity"
with hypothetical cases. Id. at 45-46. She cites neither statistics, nor even actual cases,
to demonstrate the existence or prevalence of the phenomenon. (2) She does not claim
that the Guidelines have increased sentencing disparity, only that disparity continues to
exist, an undoubted fact that even the most sanguine Guidelines supporter would not deny.
(3) Because Guideline sentencings are on the record, the factual "interpretations" made
by courts and probation officers are, contrary to the assertion of Stith and Koh, not
"hidden from view" at all, but are on the record and subject to review by courts of
appeals. The process of review leads to the elimination over time of many such
"interpretive disparities."
Mr. Hillier, in testimony before the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, claims that disparity is "a regular Guideline byproduct." Hillier, supra
at 226. But like Ms. Clarke, he neither argues for, nor provides evidence to support, the
premise that disparity has increased under the Guidelines. He argues that substantial
assistance motions under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 create disparity, but provides no evidence of
this assertion. Id.
Judge Heaney's study does not attempt to compare pre- and post-Guidelines
sentencing and arrive at general conclusions about the effect of the adoption of Guidelines
on rates of unwarranted disparity. It examines cases from only a single, post-Guidelines
year (1989), and from only four judicial districts. Heaney, supra note 128, at 167. He
concludes that, in 1989, there were differences in sentencing patterns among the four
districts, id. at 184; but without comparable data from before 1987, he is unable to reach
any general conclusion about changes in sentencing wrought by the Guidelines. For a
general critique of the Heaney study, see DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD & KENNETH E.
CARLSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ-145328, SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS:
DOES RACE MATTER? THE TRANSITION TO SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 1986-1990, 26-28
(1993). Judge Heaney does conclude that adoption of the Guidelines had a disparate
impact on Hispanic and African-American defendants in the four studied districts, Heaney,
supra note 128, at 204-05, but even this conclusion has been criticized as unsupported by
his data. See MCDONALD & CARLSON supra at 28 ("The pattern that Judge Heaney saw
as evidence of disparity could have resulted from comparing two different populations of
offenders."); Joe B. Brown, The Sentencing Guidelines Are Reducing Disparity, 29 AM.
CRim. L. REV. 875, 877-78 (1992) (arguing that the apparent disparities derived by Judge
Heaney from his 1989 data flow from the fact that certain case types move to sentencing
more quickly than others and Judge Heaney studied only the first full year of guidelines
operation).
132. SENTENCING COMM'N IMPACT REPORT, supra note 128, at 43, 47, 48, 54.
133. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GDD 92-93, SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: CENTRAL QUESTIONS REMAIN UNANSWERED 13 (1992) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT].
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Sentencing Commission's report," and found a reduction in some types
of disparity35 but the existence of others," and concluded that
"limitations and inconsistencies in the data available for pre-guidelines
and guideline offenders made it impossible to determine how effective the
sentencing guidelines have been in reducing overall sentencing
disparity."' 37 No one has studied the question since. Social scientists
who have considered the problem seem to concur that the question will
probably never be resolved conclusively because comparing the data from
before and after the implementation of the Guidelines is so very
difficult.'
All I can bring to the dispute is the experience of a practitioner who
has been both a prosecutor and, on occasion, a defense lawyer, and has
practiced before and after the Guidelines. In my experience, the level of
predictability in sentencing under the Guidelines is indisputably greater
than it was before." For most routine cases, and most cases are
134. Id. For other critiques of the Commission's approach, see William Rhodes,
Sentencing Disparity, Use of Incarceration, and Plea Bargaining: The Post-Guideline
View from the Commission, 5 FED. SENT. REP. 153-55 (1992) (calling the Commission's
study on disparity "well-crafted" and accepting that it shows a reduction in disparity after
guideline implementation, but expressing disappointment in its narrow scope and
disagreement with some of its methods); David Weisburd, Sentencing Disparity and the
Guidelines: Taking a Closer Look, 5 FED. SENT. REP. 149-52 (1992) (finding flaws in
some Commission methodology and taking issue with what Weisburd views as an overly
optimistic interpretation of the data, but not disagreeing with the general conclusion that
"disparity in sentences imposed has declined with the implementation of the guidelines").
135. GAO REPORT, supra note 133, at 10.
136. Id. at 12.
137. Id. at 10.
138. This point was first brought to my attention by Barry Ruback, Professor of
Sociology and Psychology at Pennsylvania State University. Dr. Ruback served as the
Judicial Fellow at the United States Sentencing Commission during 1995-96 and while
there, devoted considerable thought to the question of whether a valid study of the
Guidelines' effect on disparity could be designed. Professor Tonry concurs in this view.
"The evidence on federal sentencing disparities is mixed, and the best conclusion at
present is that we do not know whether disparities have increased or decreased." ToNRY,
supra note 2, at 42. Tonry further states that "[tlhe complexity of the federal guidelines
and their reliance on relevant conduct present nearly insuperable difficulties for a before-
and-after disparity analysis." Id. at 46; see also Michael Tonry, GAO Report Confirms
Failure of U.S. Guidelines, 5 FED. SENT. REP. 144, 146 (1992) (referring to the
"insurmountable problem that comparable data are not available on sentencing disparities
before and under the guidelines").
139. In fairness, let me reiterate that my career has been spent primarily as either
a state or federal prosecutor. Until recently I belonged to a group, that is, federal
prosecutors, which was most likely to report a belief that the Guidelines have reduced
unwarranted disparity, according to the survey data in the 1991 U.S. Sentencing
Commission disparity study and the 1992 GAO Report. See Tonry, supra note 138, at
146.
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routine, everybody-prosecutors, judges, defense counsel, and (if
competently advised) defendants themselves-knows what the sentencing
range will be within reasonably narrow limits very early in the criminal
process.
I hasten to add that those limits are not as narrow as Congress may
originally have hoped for, and not as narrow as some of the purists at the
Sentencing Commission might like them to be. There remains
considerable room for maneuver by prosecutors making charging
decisions,1" by both parties in crafting plea agreements, and, loath
though many of them are to admit it, by the judges themselves.141 The
140. One Guidelines critic, Professor Jeffrey Standen, admits that studies of
sentencing results under the Guidelines have so far shown no unwarranted disparity; he
maintains, however, that "the fact that all offenders similarly charged receive similar
sentences does not demonstrate parity. Rather it represents a masking of [prosecutorial]
discretion, with its unavoidably disparate results .... ." Standen, supra note 29, at 1515-
16. This is a rather remarkable statement. He implies that because studies showing a
lack of sentencing disparity do not prove the absence of prosecutorial manipulation, those
studies must prove the opposite-that prosecutorial manipulation exists. He makes no
effort, however, to offer any affirmative proof of the existence or extent of such
manipulation.
141. Several prominent appellatejudges have argued forcefully that there remains
ample scope for the exercise of guided judicial discretion under the Guidelines regime.
See, e.g., Gerald B. Tjoflat, The Untapped Potential for Judicial Discretion Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 55 FED. PROBATION 4 (1991). JudgeTjoflat, Chief Judge
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, admonishes Guidelines observers
for "fail[ing] to appreciate the significant discretion the sentencing judge retains .... "
id. Judge Tjoflat goes on to enumerate areas of discretionary authority of judges under
the Guidelines. Id. Judge Becker, U.S. Court of Appeals Judge for the Third Circuit and
former Chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee on Criminal Law and Probation
Administration, acknowledges that the Guidelines have "drastically curtailed" judicial
sentencing discretion, but contends that "there is still considerable room for flexibility and
discretion . . . ." Edward R. Becker, Flexibility and Discretion Available to the
Sentencing Judge Under the Guidelines Regime, 55 FED. PROBATION 10, 10 (1991).
Judge Selya, U.S. Court of Appeals Judge for the First Circuit, describes those areas in
which judicial discretion remains important under the Guidelines, and underscores the
special role of substantial assistance departures. Bruce M. Selya & John C. Massaro, The
Illustrative Role of Substantial Assistance Departures in Combating Ultra-Uniformity, 35
B.C. L. REv. 799, 801-03 (1994); see also Bruce M. Selya & Matthew Kipp, An
Examination of Emerging Departure Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (1991).
Even Judge Cabranes concedes that "federal trial judges themselves retain substantial
discretion over sentencing decisions, despite the presence of the guidelines," although he
goes on to note that "they are now permitted to exercise this discretion only by
performing elaborate gyrations within the confines of the guidelines calculations."
Cabranes, supra note 127, at 17. Others might characterize these 'elaborate gyrations"
as the exercise of guided discretion.
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scope of this residual discretion would be subject enough for a paper in
itself, so I will make only two points.
First, although facts drive the additions and subtractions of points
and levels that lead to a final guideline range, district judges make the
findings of fact which lead to the allocation of points. Their decisions on
factual issues are accorded great deference by courts of appeals. 2
Anyone who believes that federal district court judges are such puritanical
pillars of intellectual honesty that considerations of sentencing
consequences never sway their findings of fact has never practiced in the
federal, or indeed in any human, court system. Moreover, judges retain
the power to depart from the Guideline range," a power which the
Supreme Court may have materially broadened with its recent decision in
United States v. Koon,'" the sentencing appeal of two of the officers in
the Rodney King beating. Nonetheless, the Guidelines, now and for the
foreseeable future, give even the most result-oriented and intellectually
142. The sentencing court's factual determinations are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 557 (9th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125, 126-27 (3d. Cir. 1989); United States
v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 431 (4th Cir. 1989).
143. For a discussion of the departure power, see supra note 78 and
accompanying text.
144. 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996). In Koon, the district judge granted two of the
officers convicted of beating Rodney King significant downward departures from their
otherwise applicable guideline sentences. In explaining his decision to depart, the judge
cited five factors he asserted to be "circumstance[s of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines. . . ." Id. at 2042 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994)). The Ninth Circuit
reviewed and invalidated all of these grounds for departure. United States v. Koon, 34
F.3d 1416 (1994), reh'g en banc denied, 45 F.3d 1303 (9th Cir. 1995). The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the proper standard of appellate review for most departure
decisions is not de novo, but abuse of discretion. 116 S. Ct. at 2043.
The Koon decision represents a potentially dramatic change in Guidelines practice.
Ever since the Guidelines were first adopted, appellate courts reviewing departures under
§ 3553(b) have understood their task as one of ascertaining the boundaries the Commission
meant to set on the "heartland" of cases for which no departure is appropriate. The
question of whether a particular set of aggravating or mitigating circumstances was
.adequately taken into consideration by the Commission" was construed as a way of
asking whether the circumstances at issue fell inside or outside of that boundary. Koon,
by contrast, can be read to imply that sentencing judges may depart based on a
disagreement with the "adequacy" of the Commission'sjudgment in setting the boundaries
of the heartland, and that appellate courts should generally defer to the views of the
sentencing judge. Despite the unsettling implications of its language, the effect of the
Koon decision on federal sentencing practice is difficult to project. The hopeful view of
Koon is that sentencing judges will expand their use of the departure power enough to
ameliorate some of the harsher Guidelines outcomes, but will move with sufficient
restraint that they will neither imperil the Guidelines structure in fact, nor be perceived
as doing so by Congress, the bar, or the public.
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elastic judge much less room to roam than he would have had before
1987. I, for one, will gladly embrace a sentencing system in which most
of the time the outcome is reasonably predictable and consistent from case
to case and judge to judge over a system in which every sentencing is, by
design, an unpredictable adventure in judicial psychoanalysis.
Second, I also hasten to concede that there are, as Guidelines critics
point out, anomalies and absurdities in the Guidelines that produce unfair
results."L But considered carefully, the very fact that Guidelines critics
can identify specific sentencing rules that reliably and repetitively produce
sentences the critics consider unjust or anomalous illustrates one of the
Guidelines' great strengths. Under the Guidelines, at least we can see
most of the potholes, and can work to fill them. Before the Guidelines,
it was impossible to have rational arguments about what judges did or did
not do about particular factors thought to be relevant to sentencing,
because what the judges did was unknown and largely unknowable. The
Guidelines let light into the black box of sentencing. Of course, despite
the Guidelines, some degree of unexaminable discretion remains.
Discretion and its attendant potential for arbitrariness cannot be eliminated
entirely from any human system. But a room with a bright light
illuminating its center, while leaving some dim and shadowy corners,
remains a better environment for rational choice and incremental reform
than a sealed, windowless vault.
Judge Cabranes, in his oft-quoted "the guidelines are a dismal
failure" article, provides a classic illustration of both advantages and
flaws in the process of evolutionary change made possible by the
Guidelines system." Judge Cabranes noted the anomaly produced in
LSD cases by the rule then embodied in both statute and guideline that the
weight of any controlled substance for sentencing purposes includes the
entire "mixture or substance" in which the illegal drug is found.147
Because a user ingests LSD through "carrier media" (blotter paper, sugar
cubes, and gelatin capsules being among the more common) of widely
145. See, e.g., Standen, supra note 29, at 1507-08 (arguing that the "money
laundering" guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1, permits prosecutors to impose disparate
sentences on similar defendants by charging or not charging a money laundering offense
in fraud cases). The potential for unjustifiably disparate results presented by this guideline
was the subject of the Commission's unsuccessful 1995 amendment, and continues at this
writing to be the subject of ongoing discussions between the Commission, the Department
of Justice, and Congress.
146. Cabranes, supra note 1, at 2.
147. Id. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v) (1988); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (cmt. n.1,
9) (defining "mixture and substance" under the Guidelines); Chapman v. United States,
500 U.S. 453 (1991) (holding that 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v) requires a court to include
the weight of an ingestible carrier medium in determining the weight of narcotics for
sentencing purposes).
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divergent weight, Judge Cabranes observed that "the sentence of a dealer
selling the same dosage of LSD might vary from 10 to 16 months to as
much as 188 to 235 months depending on the weight of its carrier
medium ... ." 14 He characterized this result, not without justice, as
"loony" and "irrational." 4 9  It is, however, the Sentencing
Commission's subsequent actions to address the obvious inequity of such
results that, as the saying goes, point the moral and adorn the tale."S
In November 1993, the Sentencing Commission amended the
commentary to the drug guideline to establish a standard weight per dose
of 0.4 milligram, regardless of carrier medium, for purposes of
determining the base offense level in LSD cases, thus eliminating in
calculations under the Guidelines the disparity which distressed Judge
Cabranes. 51 Unfortunately, this apparent happy ending has been
complicated by a collision between the Commission's reform of the
Guidelines and the "mixture and substance" language in the statutes
criminalizing LSD trafficking. The Commission cannot change the
language of the statute. In United States v. Neal," the Supreme Court
decided that an alteration by the Commission in the way it measures LSD
for the purpose of Guideline calculations does not determine the meaning
of the statutory language used to ascertain the applicability of minimum
mandatory penalties.' 53 The Court said that because it had previously
decided in Chapman v. United States," that "mixture and substance"
included the entire ingestible carrier medium in LSD cases, stare decisis
precluded any change in that interpretation of the statute absent
congressional action.'55
The upshot is an incremental improvement of the situation that
existed in 1991. LSD dealers who sell their product in heavy forms will
run afoul of minimum mandatory statutory penalties in some cases where
dealers selling the same number of dosage units in light mediums will not,
148. Cabranes, supra note 1, at 2.
149. Id. In characterizing this outcome as "loony" Judge Cabranes quoted Judge
Posner of the Seventh Circuit, who made the same observation in United States v.
Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1332-33 (7th Cit. 1990), aff'd sub nom. Chapman v. United
States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991). Professor Albert Alschuler also points to cases involving
LSD carrier media as prime examples of Guidelines anomalies. Albert W. Alschuler, The
Failure of the Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
901, 919 (1991) ("Some judges are odd, but determining how many years to imprison
someone by weighing sugar cubes and blotter paper is madness.").
150. SAMUEL JOHNSON, VANrrY OF HUMAN WISHES 1.222 (1749).
151. U.S.S.G. app. C amend. 488 (1993).
152. 116 S. Ct. 763 (1996).
153. Id. at 768.
154. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
155. 116 S. Ct. at 768-69.
1996:679
HeinOnline  -- 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 721 1996
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
but the Guidelines will not escalate penalties to astronomic levels over and
above the mandatory minimums merely because one dealer chose sugar
cubes instead of blotter paper. Still, this is obviously an imperfect
solution to Judge Cabranes' legitimate concerns. What is critical to
remember, however, is that the story is not over. Congress retains the
power to amend the statute in light of the expressed concerns of the
Commission and members of the judiciary. Whether the prospect of
casting the final resolution of such matters into the arena of democratic
politics ought to cause satisfaction or alarm is a question to which I will
return at the conclusion of this article.
In truth, what most Guidelines critics really mean when they say
unwarranted disparities have increased under the Guidelines is that the
Guidelines do not account for many factors the critics think should be
considered in defining similar and dissimilar cases. Critics of this school
do no more than recast the argument in favor of "individualized"
sentencing into an "unwarranted disparities" mold." The more
perceptive of such commentators say plainly that the source of their
critique is not unwarranted disparity' but what they perceive to be an
undesirable uniformity.' Other complaints about "disparity" are
actually arguments that the Guidelines should assign different weights to
the factors they do consider. For example, some critics have claimed that
unwarranted disparity results if a cooperating defendant receives a lower
sentence than his less culpable, but noncooperating, co-defendant. 5 '
This is not a case of unwarranted disparity.
Brief elaboration on the point will make it clear. The phenomenon
of which the critics complain arises when co-conspirator A, who is more
knowledgeable about and more culpable for the acts of a criminal group
than co-conspirator B, cooperates with the authorities and B does not.
Critics find it anomalous that A may receive a lower sentence than B after
the government makes a motion for reduction of A's sentence below the
otherwise applicable guideline or statutory minimum under 18 U.S.C.
Section 3553(b) and/or U.S.S.G. Section 5K1.1. The perceived anomaly
has been christened the "cooperation paradox."'"
156. For a discussion of the debate over "individualized sentencing," see supra
notes 109-26 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process:
The Problem is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 833 (1992).
158. See, e.g., Hillier, supra note 131, at 224.
159. Stephen J. Schuihofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 199, 211-12 (1993); see also Philip Oliss, Comment, Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1851, 1858 (1995) (referring to this phenomenon as "inverted sentencing" and as
the "cooperation paradox").
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Despite its superficial appeal (which undoubtedly owes something to
the catchy cognomen "cooperation paradox") this argument lacks much
real bite. Any time a criminal receives leniency for informing on his
comrades, there is some compromise of the principle of meting out
punishment among the population of offenders in direct proportion to
blameworthiness. The inevitable effect of giving sentencing credit for
assistance to the authorities is to impose lower sentences on cooperators
than on similarly-situated noncooperators. Even if the sentence given the
informer is not lower than that of less culpable co-defendants in his own
case, it will certainly be lower than that imposed on equally or less
culpable noncooperating defendants in other cases. After all, this is the
point of the program. The value of the Section 5K1.1 motion in
investigations of group criminality is to break group solidarity by offering
preferential sentencing treatment to those who turn on their colleagues.
In passing 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(b), Congress made two judgments.
First, Congress made the value judgment that cooperating and
noncooperating defendants are not similarly situated. Second, Congress
made the policy judgment that the social utility of achieving convictions
through bargained-for testimony outweighs the cost, if any, of deviating
from a sentencing system that ranks penalties strictly by relative
culpability measured at the time of the commission of the crime.
The particular outrage expressed by critics over situations in which
the sentence of a "more culpable" cooperator is lower than that of a "less
culpable" noncooperator is a red herring. The principle of sentencing in
proportion to culpability is no less compromised when cooperating
defendant A receives a lower sentence than equally culpable
noncooperating co-defendant B, than it is if A's sentence is lower than
noncooperating co-defendant C, whose culpability is ten percent (or one
percent) less than A's and B's. Moreover, in order to preserve strict
proportionality of sentencing among co-defendants, the maximum
sentencing concession available to any cooperator would have to be
limited by the purely arbitrary factor of the sentence of the next-most-
culpable co-defendant. For example, a cooperating defendant could
receive a ten-month reduction in sentence if the next-most-culpable
defendant in his case received a sentence ten months lower than the
cooperator's guideline range. A cooperator in a different case who was
identically situated, except that there happened to be no less culpable co-
defendants in the case, would have no downward limit on the sentence
reduction a judge might award. A cooperation system structured in this
way would be both practically ineffective (because it would frequently
preclude offering meaningful incentives to those with valuable information
to impart) and facially unjust (because sentence reductions for cooperation
would be subject to arbitrary limitations having no relationship to the
value of the cooperation provided).
1996:679 723 .
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One can argue that the government should not be in the business of
bartering with hoodlums for information, but neither the practice of doing
so, in general, or the so-called "cooperation paradox," in particular, are
unique creations of the Guidelines."W One may also disagree with the
judgment, made by the original Sentencing Commission and ratified by
Congress, to codify in the Guidelines a formalized version of the
historical practice of rewarding cooperating defendants with sentencing
concessions. In either case, however, it cannot be fairly argued that the
perceived flaw in the present Guidelines is one related to unwarranted
disparity.
In sum, the Guidelines' many detractors have failed to make a
convincing case that "disparity" is a crippling problem for the current
federal sentencing system.
C. Prosecutors Have All the Power
I mentioned above that prosecutors possess some discretionary power
to influence sentencing outcomes through charging decisions and plea
negotiations. The existence of that power, and its actual or alleged scope,
is one of the biggest sore points for Guidelines critics. Again, Judge
Cabranes: "[Tihe guidelines have sub silentio moved the locus of
discretion from the judge to the prosecutor."161 On this issue, Judge
Cabranes' comments are among the more restrained. Critics commonly
allege that the Guidelines represent a wholesale transfer of discretion from
judges to prosecutors.'6 2 One commentator goes so far as to say that
160. See Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45
VAND. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1992) (describing the long historical roots in England and the
United States of granting sentencing concessions, including complete immunity, to
informants and cooperating co-defendants); see also The Whiskey Cases (United States
'v. Ford) 99 U.S. 594, 599 (1878).
161. Cabranes, supra note 1, at 2.
162. See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CoMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY CoMMITTEE 138 (1990) ("[W]e have been told that the rigidity of the
guidelines is causing a massive, though unintended, transfer of discretion and authority
from the court to the prosecutor."); Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen Schulhofer, Judicial
Impressions of the Sentencing Guidelines, 2 FED. SENT. REP. 94, 94-99 (1989) (describing
results of a poll taken among participants at a conference of federal judges which
suggested judicial concern over "a transfer of sentencing discretion from judges to
prosecutors."); Fisher, supra note 9, at 749 ("[A) tangible amount of discretion has
shifted to prosecutors."); Bennett L. Gershman, The Most Fundamental Change in the
Criminal Justice System: The Role of the Prosecutor in Sentence Reduction, 5 CRIM. JUST.
2, 4 (1990) ("Since the prosecutor is able to make a very precise selection of the ultimate
sentence, the judge's role is simply to ratify the choice of sentence determined by the
prosecutor."); Mank, supra note 30, at 400 ("Courts and commentators have criticized
the Guidelines for expanding prosecutorial power at the expense of judges."); Freed,
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"this transfer of discretion from judges to prosecutors undermines the
American system of justice.""
The assertion that the Guidelines represent a dramatic transfer of
sentencing power from judges to prosecutors is grounded in this much
truth: The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 did reduce, and reduce
dramatically, the sentencing discretion of judges. 1" That was, after all,
its principal purpose." What is critical to understand, however, is that
supra note 79, at 1697.
Plea bargains in the age of guidelines add significantly to the prosecutor's
traditional power over charging and guilty pleas. The guidelines do not
explicitly confer new power on the prosecutor, nor do they, in a technical
sense, "transfer" power from the judge to the Assistant U.S. Attorney
(AUSA). But to the extent that the guideline parameters diminish the
power of the judge, they correspondingly enhance the power of the
prosecutor.
Id.; see also United States v. Boshell, 728 F. Supp. 632, 642 (E.D. Wash. 1990); United
States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1362-66 (D.D.C. 1990).
Even Judge Andrew Kleinfeld, a member of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and
a supporter of the Guidelines, writes that "[tihe most troubling area of guideline
sentencing is the way it shifts sentencing control from judges to prosecutors." Andrew
J.* Kleinfeld, The Sentencing Guidelines Promote Truth and Justice, 55 FED. PROBATION
16, 19 (1991).
163. Kimberly S. Kelley, Substantial Assistance Under the Guidelines: How
Smitherman Transfers Sentencing Discretion from Judges to Prosecutors, 76 IowA L.
REv. 187, 189 (1990); see also Roberts, 728 F. Supp. 1359, 1363 (D.D.C. 1989)
(contending that transfer of discretion to prosecutors under the Guidelines is so extreme
as to "disturb the due process balance essential to the fairness of criminal litigation").
164. See Fisher, supra note 9, at 748 (arguing that the SRA was successful in
achieving the goal of "abat[ing] judicial discretion in the sentencing arena"); Freed, supra
note 79, at 1697 ("Guidelines are administrative handcuffs that are applied to judges and
no one else."); Mank, supra note 30, at 402-03 ("While the Guidelines give some
sentencing discretion to judges, there is little question that district courts have far less
authority today, and prosecutors far more, than they had before the 1984 act created the
Commission."); William J. Powell & Michael T. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discretion Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox Guarding the Hen House?, 97 W. VA. L.
REv. 373, 382 (1995) ("Much of the substantial power held by federal judges prior to
[November 1, 19871 simply vanished. The Sentencing Commission and prosecutors
became the newly empowered.. ").
165. "Congress clearly intended to structure and narrow judicial discretion by
developing guidelines. But comparatively few commentators anticipated the extent to
which enhanced prosecutorial power would fill the judicial vacuum created by the
guidelines." Freed, supra note 79, at 1698. See also Lee, supra note 32, at 116
(asserting that Congress sought to achieve its goals of sentencing reform in two ways: (1)
imposing "restrictions on judicial sentencing discretion" and (2) "some discretion
previously exercised by federal judges [was] shifted or 'displaced' to other sources of
authority-,in particular, to the offices of the prosecutor"); Stith & Koh, supra note 7, at
278 (observing that the attitude of the Senate, in particular, was that "the judges were 'the
problem'").
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the Guidelines restrict judicial choice, first, by limiting the universe of
facts which a judge is permitted to consider in setting a sentence, and
second, by dictating that those kinds of facts which can count, must
count.
What do I mean? Remember, the Guidelines say that most of the
factors judges formerly used to individualize sentences-age, sex, family
ties, community good works, employment history, and so forth-cannot
now be considered either in setting the Guideline range or in departing
from that range." Now only the seriousness of the offense and the
defendant's criminal history count. But those things, if proven, must be
counted. If the government proves or the defendant admits that he sold
500 grams of crack, the judge cannot ignore that fact. If the defendant
has two prior felonies, the judge cannot ignore that fact. In such a
system, the actions of the prosecutors inevitably have a great effect,
because prosecutors are the "masters of the facts." They control access
to most of the evidence upon which the factual findings that drive the
Guidelines depend. Indeed, when I was a practicing prosecutor, this
always seemed the single best feature of the Guidelines. Before 1987, the
only thing I could really do at a sentencing hearing was stand up, wrap
myself in the flag, and call the defendant names. No amount of evidence
on any particular point would have any necessary effect on the sentence.
With the advent of the Guidelines, if I did my job as an advocate, I could
achieve concrete results.
When Guidelines critics complain about the transfer of discretion to
prosecutors, they are not complaining about the requirement that proof of
certain facts dictates particular sentencing outcomes. They are not
complaining about the ability of prosecutors to achieve higher sentences
by presenting additional inculpatory or aggravating evidence to the court,
or to the extent they are making that complaint, it does not withstand
scrutiny. There is a difference between power and discretion. The motor
in your car has the power to make the car move. What it lacks is the
"discretion" to choose to move or not move. The mere creation of a fact-
based sentencing system gives prosecutors power to affect sentences by
presenting facts. Nonetheless, a prosecutor has discretion in such a
system only to the degree that she is free to choose either to present or to
withhold inculpatory facts.
Therefore, what Guideline critics are complaining about is the
possibility that prosecutors will manipulate sentences downward, by
charging less than the most serious provable offense or withholding
incriminating evidence from the court. The prosecutor may do so in order
166. See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
limitations placed on grounds for departure by U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 Pt. H (1995).
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to facilitate a plea bargain, or simply to achieve a result that she finds
more in harmony with her sense of justice than the sentence the
Guidelines would have dictated if the judge had all the facts. 67
There are two basic responses to this critique. First, prosecutors
undoubtedly do, through charging decisions and plea bargains, sometimes
seek, or agree to, lower than the maximum possible sentences. They
have always done that. With respect to charging decisions, the Guidelines
themselves do not even attempt to limit the historical practice. Indeed,
it is difficult to imagine a system which could eliminate prosecutorial
charging discretion. Nonetheless, the Justice Department recognized at
the outset of the Guidelines era that unrestrained pre-indictment
bargaining over charges would undermine the Guidelines, particularly the
effort to achieve something close to a real offense system.'" Therefore,
it issued internal directives that prosecutors are to charge the most serious
readily provable offense "consistent with the nature of the defendant's
conduct." s Likewise, absent special circumstances, federal
prosecutors may accept pleas to no less than one count of the most serious
readily provable offense. " This directive clearly has some wiggle
room in it (what, after all, is "readily provable"?), and it has been
167. See Thomas E. Zeno, A Prosecutor's View of the Sentencing Guidelines, 55
FED. PROBATION 31 (1991). Zeno admits that application by individual prosecutors of
their personal notion of what is "fair" in crafting plea agreements which omit or
misrepresent facts "would return unwarranted disparity to sentencing by allowing
prosecutors to decide when the guidelines sentence should be imposed and when it should
not." Id. at 33.
168. For a detailed description of the process by which the Department of Justice
policy regarding charging and plea negotiation practices under the Guidelines was
developed, see Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An
Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practice Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 506-12 (1992); see also Zeno, supra note 167, at
32-33 ("Nothing prevents prosecutors from introducing unwarranted disparity into the
system by charging one defendant less severely than another, for reasons decided upon
solely by the prosecutor. Admittedly, the idea of needing to curb prosecutorial lenity
seems unusual; but the Department of Justice anticipated precisely this problem when the
guidelines were promulgated.").
169. The current DOJ policy is embodied in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S.
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, §9-27.000-27.720 (1995) [hereinafter USAM]. One of the
purposes of the Principles of Federal Prosecution is to assure that charging and plea
bargaining practices do not undermine the SRA's goal of reducing unwarranted sentencing
disparity. See Memorandum from Attorney Janet Reno to Holders of the United States
Attorney's Manual (Oct. 12, 1993) in 6 FED. SENT. REP. 352 (1994) [hereinafter Reno
Memo]. Accordingly, the basic policy is that prosecutors must charge "the most serious
offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant's conduct, and that is likely to
result in a sustainable conviction." USAM § 9-27.310 (1995).
170. USAM § 9-27.410.
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softened a bit under the Clinton Administration, but the basic principle
remains. 171
As for plea bargains after indictment, the primary justification of the
relevant conduct guideline is to ensure that prosecutors cannot manipulate
sentences by dismissing counts." As long as the judge knows all the
facts, the precise charge of which a defendant is convicted is usually of
little consequence except to set the statutory maximum sentence.
Moreover, given that so many Guidelines battles are fought over drug
sentences, it bears emphasis that the statutory maximum sentences in such
cases are, as a rule, so high that the real points of contention are
invariably the quantity-driven minimum sentences prescribed by either
statute or guideline." Drug quantity is a fact known to the prosecutor
and critical to sentencing, but not directly relevant to the charging
decision. Similarly, the primary sentence determinant in fraud cases is
171. The Reno Memo, supra note 169, contains some language clearly intended
to give prosecutors somewhat more leeway than they had been granted under the Bush
Administration. The memorandum states, in part:
It should be emphasized that charging decisions and plea agreements
should reflect adherence to the Sentencing Guidelines. However, a
faithful and honest application of the Sentencing Guidelines is not
incompatible with selecting charges or entering into plea agreements on
the basis of an individualized assessment of the extent to which particular
charges fit the specific circumstances of the case, are consistent with the
purposes of the federal criminal code, and maximize the impact of federal
resources on crime.
Id. at 2. The Reno Memo drew from Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, an immediate and disapproving response in the form of a letter to
the Attorney General. See Letter from Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Senate Judiciary
Committee Chair, to Attorney General Janet Reno (Jan. 13, 1994) in 6 FED. SENT. REP.
353 (1994). Attorney Reno replied with a letter that appeared to disavow any intention
to change previous policy. Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno to Senator Orrin G.
Hatch, Senate Judiciary Committee Chair (Mar. 8, 1994) in 6 FED. SENT. REP. 353
(1994). The result appears to be a reversion to previous policy. See James K. Bredar &
Jeffrey E. Risberg, The Reno Retreat: New Department of Justice "Bluesheet" DOA, 6
FED. SENT. REP. 313 (1994) (contending that the net result of the Hatch-Reno exchange
was a retreat by the Department of Justice to the position of the Thornburgh
Memorandum).
172. See Wilkins & Steer, supra note 98, at 499-500 (explaining that a primary
function of the relevant conduct provisions of the Guidelines was to limit the effect of
prosecutorial discretion on guideline outcomes).
173. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (1994) (setting the statutory maximum
penalty for possession with intent to distribute any quantity of cocaine, heroin, and other
schedule I or II controlled substances at 20 years imprisonment).
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not the crime of conviction,174 but the amount of "loss 175-a fact
determined at sentencing. Thus, in order to really control sentences
through plea bargaining, a prosecutor must be willing to hide facts from
the court.
I will not say that no such event has ever occurred. The temptation
for a prosecutor to jigger the facts in collusion with defense counsel is
sometimes awfully strong. But the position of the Department of Justice
has been and remains that misstating or concealing relevant facts from the
court, even in aid of preserving a plea agreement, is unethical. 76 Thus,
the Guidelines critics are right to the extent that if federal prosecutors as
a group are willing to behave unethically, then they are indeed not only
the masters of the facts, but the masters of the Guidelines.
The truth is that most prosecutors, most of the time, play the
sentencing game straight down the middle.'" To achieve plea bargains,
174. If the amount of loss in a property crime case, combined with other
aggravating factors, were high enough to dictate a sentence in excess of 60 months (five
years), one could in theory limit a defendant's maximum exposure by negotiating a plea
to one count of an offense such as mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994), that carries a
statutory maximum sentence of five years per count of conviction.
175. For a discussion of the theft guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (1995), see supra
note 64 and accompanying text.
176. The Principles of Federal Prosecution provide that federal prosecutors are
to provide all requested information to the United States Probation Service whenever
possible so that an accurate and complete presentence report can be prepared. USAM 9-
27.720 (1995). The Principles go on to state that "the Department's policy is only to
stipulate to facts that accurately represent the defendant's conduct. If a prosecutor wishes
to support a departure from the guidelines, he or she should candidly do so and not
stipulate to facts that are untrue. Stipulations to untrue facts are unethical. " USAM 9-
27.430 (emphasis added).
177. Virtually every claim in the academic literature that prosecutorial "evasion"
or "manipulation" of the Guidelines is widespread takes as its authority a single estimate
by Steven Schulhofer that Guidelines manipulation occurs "in twenty to thirty-five percent
of all guilty plea cases." Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing
Process: The Problem Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 845
(1992); see, e.g., Freed, supra note 79, at 1683 n.2 (citing Schulhofer as evidence that
an "underground" system of "informal noncompliance" is undermining the Guidelines).
Schulhofer's estimate is a tenuous cornerstone on which to build much of an edifice.
First, the 20-35% figure is not an estimate of the prevalence of "fact bargaining," but
seems to combine in a single category Schulhofer's estimates of the incidence of various
techniques of circumventing a strict application of the Guidelines, including charging
offenses with low statutory maximums and making substantial assistance motions for
defendants whose assistance was, in truth, not very useful. Schulhofer estimates that pure
fact manipulation occurs only in "perhaps five percent of the total" number of plea cases.
Id. at 844.
Second, the 20-35% figure is at best subjective and imprecise, although, it is
admittedly difficult to know how one acquires hard data on this subject. It is apparently
based on Schulhofer's personal interpretation of a series of interviews done with Assistant
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they will give defendants the benefit of close calls on the provability of
certain facts, or on the applicability of certain enhancements to the
undoubted facts of a given case. But they will not lie and they will not
conceal evidence. The consequence is that prosecutors, too, have had their
discretion restrained by the Guidelines. Because of the Guidelines, they
can no longer make just any plea agreement that suits their administrative
convenience or personal sense of justice."n While it may come as a
surprise to Judge Cabranes and his judicial colleagues, probably the
biggest complaint among prosecutors about the Guidelines is that they
restrict prosecutorial discretion.,"
Considerations of prosecutorial ethics aside, perhaps the greatest
institutional constraint on unbridled manipulation of the facts by the
parties is the United States Probation Office, an agency of the judicial
U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) as part of a study of plea bargaining he did with former
Sentencing Commissioner Ilene Nagel. For a description of the methods employed in the
study, see Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 168, at 512-16. Indeed, Schulhofer himself
is so uncertain of the accuracy of the figure that he said:
This figure is a rough estimate and reflects a national average; the data makes
clear that guideline manipulation varies widely among districts.
Unfortunately, I cannot begin, in this space, to defend the accuracy of this
estimate. Those with different intuitions are entitled to retain their own view
until a detailed analysis can be presented.
Schulhofer, supra at 845 (emphasis added).
As far as I can determine, no further "detailed analysis" of the Nagel-Schulhofer
data on this particular point has been published. Moreover, perhaps the most important
point about the Schulhofer estimate is that, even if true, it means that there is no attempt
to manipulate guidelines in 65 to 80% of cases. That is a considerable success rate. See
Brown, supra note 131, at 880. "From my experience as Chair of the [Attorney
General's Advisory Committee on the Sentencing Guidelinesi I believe the Department's
policy [on adherence to the Guidelines] is carried out in the vast majority of cases." Id.
178. For a discussion of the appropriate Department of Justice response to the
specific problem posed by the allegation that prosecutors commonly manipulate facts at
sentencing, see Frank 0. Bowman, III, To Tell the Truth: The Problem of Prosecutorial
"Manipulation" of Sentencing Facts, 8 FED. SENT. REP. 324 (1996).
179. See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMM. (1990) reprinted in 2 FED. SENT. REP. 232 (1990), in which the
Committee (a distinguished group that included Judge Jos6 A. Cabranes) reported that they
"were told as well that the guidelines unduly constrain prosecutors by limiting the
concessions they can legitimately offer to induce guilty pleas." Id. at 234; see also
William Braniff, Intra- and Extra-Guideline Prosecutorial Discretion, 7 FED. SENT. REP.
133, 135-36 (1994) (expressing discomfort with the degree to which the Guidelines
circumscribe legitimate prosecutorial discretion, and recommending the creation of
internal Department of Justice policies to define, legitimize, and monitor occasions for
prosecutorial "departures" from strict adherence to Guidelines rules); Brown, supra note
131, at 880 (discussing resistance against the Guidelines by some "generally older
Assistant United States Attorneys who try to justify their action with the thought, 'I know
what the case is worth'").
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branch whose officers investigate the facts which form the basis for the
guidelines calculations and then report directly, and often exparte, to the
sentencing judge."W Probation officers prepare the Presentence
Investigation Report that becomes the factual baseline from which the
parties customarily argue."" Various commentators have remarked that
this responsibility transforms probation officers from social workers
identified in the eyes of many with protection of the interests of
defendants to so-called "guardians of the guidelines."" I can testify
from personal experience that federal probation officers take their new
guardianship very seriously." The consequence of their activist
180. The practice in the Southern District of Florida, where I spent seven years
as an Assistant United States Attorney, is for the probation officer assigned a defendant
to write the Presentence Investigation Report (which is distributed to the parties) and to
consult privately before sentencing with the judge in chambers about the disputed issues
of law and fact. This is the practice in many other districts as well.
181. Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the
probation officer make the Presentence Report (PSR) available to the parties "not less than
35 days before sentencing." FED. R. CiuM. P. 32(b)(6)(A). Within 14 days following
disclosure, the parties are permitted to file written objections to the report with the
probation officer. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(6)(B). The probation officer responds to these
objections. FED. R. CIuM. P. 32(b)(6)(C). The court is then permitted to adopt the
language of the PSR as findings of fact except as to matters successfully disputed by the
parties. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(6)(D); see also U.S.S.G. Ch.6 Pt. A (1995).
182. See, e.g., Sharon M. Bunzel, Note, The Probation Officer and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Strange Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 YALE L.J. 933,934 (1994)
(describing the transformation of the role of federal probation officers from neutral social
workers in a system aimed at rehabilitation of offenders to "'guardian[s]' of the
Guidelines."). Bunzel observes that, "[as the defender of Guidelines protocol, the
probation officer presents an obstacle to the prosecutor's discretion in arriving at plea
agreements." Id. at 962-64; see also Clarke, supra note 131, at 47 (characterizing
probation officers as "guardians of the guidelines"); Jerry D. Denzlinger & David E.
Miller, The Federal Probation Officer: Life Before and After Guideline Sentencing, 55
FED. PROBATION 49, 49-52 (1991) (contrasting the work of probation officers before and
after the adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and noting that the probation
officer sometimes "stands alone" when advocating factual or legal positions that neither
party supports due to an interest in maintaining a plea agreement); John Hagan & Ilene
Nagel Bernstein, The Sentence Bargaining of Upperworld and Underworld Crime in Ten
Federal District Courts, 13 LAw & Soc'Y 467, 474 (1979) (noting the then-current view
of "the traditional role of probation officers in assessing the defendant's potential for
rehabilitation").
183. The concern of probation officers for ensuring that guideline sentence
calculations be based on all available facts, irrespective of the desires of the parties, was
manifested recently in a letter from the Probation Officers Advisory Group to Judge
Richard P. Conaboy, Chairman of the Sentencing Commission. Letter from Francesca
D. Bowman, Probation Officers Advisory Group Chair, to Judge Richard P. Conaboy,
Sentencing Commission Chair 1 (Jan. 30, 1996) (on file with the author). The letter
summarizes the results of a survey sent to probation officers in 85 districts and expresses
the concern that, in the view of some probation officers, the government is "usually"
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approach is that, whereas busy federal judges might miss, or be disposed
to gloss over, the kinds of prosecutorial factual omissions that can grease
a plea agreement, the probation officers, acting as agents of the court,
have assumed the role of "special master" of Guidelines facts. In this
role they give the judges the resources to keep the parties honest and to
prevent the most obvious efforts at Guidelines manipulation.
One last point about the bogeyman of rampant prosecutorial
discretion: The people who most loudly denounce the power of
prosecutors to "circumvent" the Guidelines to allow less-than-maximum
sentences are often the same people who are most displeased about the
length of the sentences which the Guidelines require when strictly applied.
I say to such folks-be careful what you wish for because you may get it.
In the present and foreseeable political environment, the most likely
response to such arguments from both the Sentencing Commission and
Congress will be to tighten the screws still further-to try to squeeze even
more discretion from the system.1 ' When prosecutors can exercise the
discretion that is the source of the complaint in only one direction-to
allow a lower sentence than the facts of the case, vigorously presented,
would require" -those Guidelines critics whose real concern is
sentence length may want to lower their voices just a bit.
cooperative in supplying information, but that there appear to be exceptions "when the
government wants to protect a plea agreement." Id. at 2. For the reaction of numerous
commentators to the probation survey see Assessing the Probation Officers' Survey: Does
Fact Bargaining Undermine the Sentencing Guidelines, 8 FED. SENT. REP. 299 (1996)
(discussing nine articles reviewing the survey results).
184. Proposals of just this sort were part of a number of sentencing reform bills
drafted during the long evolutionary process that finally produced the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984. At one time or another, both the Senate and the House were considering
bills requiring the development of guidelines for prosecutorial charging and plea
negotiation decisions. Stith & Koh, supra note 7, at 261-66.
185. 1 deliberately have not addressed the most explicit delegation of discretion
to prosecutors under the Guidelines, the prosecutorial monopoly on the power to make
motions for downward departures based on a defendant's cooperation with the government
in the investigation or prosecution of others. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994) (authorizing
a court to depart below the otherwise applicable statutory minimum mandatory sentence
on motion of the government); U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (1995) (authorizing a court to depart
below the otherwise applicable guideline sentencing range on motion of the government).
This is a complex subject for another day. For the present, it is sufficient to observe that,
once again, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to make a substantial assistance motion
can result only in reductions to the sentence that would otherwise be required, and that
district court judges retain virtually unreviewable discretion to grant or deny such
motions. See, e.g., United States v. Ortez, 902 F.2d 61, 63-64 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United
States v. Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1528 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Bayerle, 898
F.2d 28, 30-31 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Morales, 898 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir.
1990).
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D. Those Sentences
Which brings us to those sentences. They are longer under the
Guidelines than they used to be, a lot longer. From 1984 to 1990, the
average federal sentence of incarceration (a figure which excludes those
cases in which probation was ordered) rose from twenty-four months to
forty-six months." By fiscal year 1994, the average federal sentence
(again excluding cases in which probation was ordered) had risen to 65.9
months." The reaction in some quarters to the overall rise in federal
sentences has been an undifferentiated primal howl of anguish.' As
I will discuss below, some of that dismay is warranted. Much of it,
however, is not. A sober assessment of the sentences the Guidelines
generate depends on a nuanced understanding of how Congress and the
Commission went about setting penalties for various categories of crime.
The overall increase in federal criminal sentences was not only a
predictable outcome of these particular Guidelines, it was inevitable.
Recall that the Commission set out to increase sentences for drug and
white collar crimes.'" Those two categories of offenses comprise
roughly two-thirds of all federal cases."° Moreover, the method chosen
by the Commission for setting the sentences for the remaining one-third
of the cases handled in the federal courts ensured that the increases in
drug and white collar sentences would not be offset by decreases
elsewhere. The Commission set sentencing levels for crimes such as bank
robbery, immigration offenses, and the like by studying a sample of
10,000 actual past cases and determining what sentences had been given
186. SENTENCINo COMM'N IMPACT REPORT, supra note 128, at 60. As indicated,
the figure in the text excludes from the average all probationary sentences by counting
such sentences as zero months. Id. Including probationary sentences, the average
sentence rose from 13 months in 1984 to 30 months in 1990. Id.
187. U.S. SENTrENClO COMM'N 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, 54-55, thl. 21
[hereinafter 1994 ANNUAL REPORT]. The median federal sentence of incarceration in
1994 was 36 months. Id.
188. One prominent academic has written of drug sentences under the Guidelines
that it is unclear "that a federal judge who follows the national sentencing guidelines is
entitled to the Nuremberg defense that he or she was following orders in so violating the
rights of those guilty of marginally harmful conduct." Paul D. Carrington, The Twenty-
First Wssdom, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 333, 353 (1995).
189. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. It may be too much to say
that the original Commission consciously desired an increase in drug sentences, but it is
undeniable that the Commission consciously created a structure for drug sentences which
could have had no other result.
190. For example, in fiscal year 1993, narcotics offenses constituted 43.9% of
offenses committed by defendants sentenced under the Guidelines; embezzlement
constituted 2.2%; larceny constituted 7.4%; fraud defendants constituted 13.3%. 1993
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 106, at 55.
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and why."g' The Commission then attempted to create guidelines for
these offenses that "followed typical past practice."" In short,
sentences for the one-third of federal cases that involved neither drugs nor
white collar crime were set at roughly their pre-Guidelines levels, and
sentences for the remaining two-thirds were raised.
1. WHITE COLLAR CRIME SENTENCES
One of the reasons the Commission did not apply to white collar
crime its method of setting guideline prison sentences by reference to past
practice is that, before the Guidelines, there were scarcely enough
instances of actual imprisonment of white collar crooks to provide a
statistically useful sample. As Justice Breyer put it in 1988, "A pre-
Guidelines sentence imposed on these criminals would likely take the
form of straight probationary sentences. " " The Commission
concluded not only that white collar criminals received probation at a very
high rate, but that when prison sentences were actually imposed, they
were shorter than those given to "blue collar" criminals who stole similar
amounts.' In consequence, the Commission decided to "require short
but certain terms of confinement for many white collar offenders
"195
The Commission's decision to require prison in some cases where
"non-incarcerative alternatives" had previously been the norm has been
the subject of much indignant protest.'9 To hear the critics tell it, the
191. Breyer, supra note 38, at 7 n.50.
192. id.
193. Id. at 7 n.49; see also Hagan & Nagel Bernstein, supra note 182, at 475
("[Ulnless we [advocate strongly for imprisonment] almost everybody would walk out on
probation. . .") (quoting an AUSA regarding an office policy of vigorous advocacy in
white collar sentencing hearings).
194. Breyer, supra note 38, at 20-21.
195. Id. at 20.
196. See Freed, supra note 79, at 1706-08; Donald P. Lay, Rethinking the
Guidelines: A Call for Cooperation, 101 YALE L.J. 1755, 1766 (1992) (complaining that
then-pending amendments to the Guidelines "do not adequately address the concept of
intermediate punishment"); Lawrence S. Lustberg, The Importance of Purposes in
Choosing Between Prison and Probation, 3 FED. SENT. REP. 334, 334 (1991) (arguing
that the Guidelines have created a "presumption of imprisonment" and that this supposed
presumption arose from a failure by the Sentencing Commission to consider adequately
the appropriate purposes of punishment); Stith & Koh, supra note 7, at 266-69, 284-85
(characterizing the outcome of the legislative process which produced the SRA as
.encouragement of imprisonment," and noting the "rigidity and harshness" with which
the Sentencing Commission implemented the SRA); Tonry supra note 52, at 356
(criticizing decrease in availability of probationary sentences as being "based on a false
policy premise"); Michele H. Kalstein et al., Comment, Calculating Injustice: The
HeinOnline  -- 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 734 1996
1996:679 The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained
Commission's choice bordered on medieval barbarism."9 Reading the
numerous complaints on this score, one would think that the Guidelines
were a reversion to the French penal system which condemned Jean
Valjean to the galleys for stealing a loaf of bread.'" Indeed, some of
the more fevered critics have made the comparison explicit. 9
Whatever may be said about the federal drug guidelines, the average
citizen will be unlikely to weep for the plight of the federal white collar
offender once apprised of the facts. The facts are that the Guidelines do
not require an embezzler who is caught and pleads guilty to his crime to
spend a single day in a penitentiary unless he has embezzled more than
$200,000. Even in that case, the guideline range would be eight to
fourteen months,"' and the embezzler could, if the judge permitted,
serve half of the sentence at a half-way house or in home
confinement.' Two hundred grand buys a lot of baguettes.
Of course, a district court judge may elect to impose a prison term
on one who steals less than $200,000, but contrary to the imputations of
Fixation on Punishment as Crime Control, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 575, 608-09
(1992).
197. See generally Lois G. FORER, A RAOE TO PUNISH: THE UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF MANDATORY SENTENCINO 20-29 (1994) (tracing a "medieval legacy"
of equating crime with sin which the author claims leads to the overuse of incarceration
as punishment).
198. "Jean Valjean was born of a poor peasant family .... There was a very
severe winter; Jean had no work, the family had no bread; literally, no bread, and seven
children." So he stole bread, he was caught, and the tribunal sentenced him to five years
in the galleys. VICTOR HUOO, LES MISERABLES 29-30 (Charles Wilbour trans., Halcyon
House 1947) (1862).
199. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Ancient Law and the Punishment of
Corporations: Of Frankpledge and Deodand, 71 B.U. L. REV. 307, 310 (1991) ("[The
Commission] has announced a stance of 'no mercy' for Jean Valjean, declaring that
economic hardship is no warrant for a decrease in sentence."); Albert W. Alsehuler,
Departures and Plea Agreements Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 117 F.R.D. 459, 465
(1988) ("The Commission may have taken its stance of 'no mercy' for Jean Valjean
deliberately, but it is not clear that a one-sentence ipse dixit can impose so pitiless a
policy upon the federal courts."); Kalstein et al., supra note 196, at 575-76 (1992)
(comparing Jean Valjean to a poor youthful drug dealer).
200. This calculation assumes that the defendant embezzled more than $200,000
in a one-time event which did not require "more than minimal planning" under U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1I.1(b)(4)(A) (1995). It assumes further that the defendant pled guilty sufficiently
early in the process to avail himself of the three-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1 .1(a), (b). If the defendant's crime did involve
"more than minimal planning," some incarceration would be required for stealing
$70,000. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 and Ch. 5 Pt. A.
201. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
202. See U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1, Imposition of a Term of Probation, and § 5C1.1,
Imposition of a Term of Imprisonment.
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the Guidelines' critics, the court is rarely bound to do so. Moreover, not
only does one have to steal a great deal of money before prison is
required, but the Guidelines set what some might consider embarrassingly
low sentences for defendants who have stolen obscenely large amounts.
For example, an embezzler or swindler who stole between $20,000,000
and $40,000,000 would, if he pled guilty, receive a Guideline sentence
of only thirty-seven to forty-six months.' Forty million dollars is not
a bad return for three or four years in the galleys, much less in a well-
appointed federal correctional facility.
The very high threshold loss amount that the Guidelines require
before mandating imprisonment in federal property crime cases
illuminates two other points that Guideline critics either miss or
misrepresent. First, if one read only the academic literature about the
Guidelines, one might easily conclude that in the federal system probation
is now as dead as parole, and that any Guidelines sentence must be a
prison sentence. Prominent Guidelines critic Michael Tonry has declared
categorically, "The guidelines allow virtually no role for nonimprisonment
sentences." ' In fact, in 1995, 21.3% of the defendants convicted in
federal court and sentenced under the Guidelines received a sentence of
probation.15 In 1994, the figure was 22.2%;" in 1993, 22.7%.1
Thus, contrary to Professor Tonry's confident claim, in the past three
years, more than one-fifth of all federal sentences have been
"nonimprisonment sentences." It is true that in 1993, 1994 and 1995,
about one-third of federal probationers were subject to some condition of
confinement-intermittent confinement, 211 community confinement,'
203. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, Theft, and § 2F1.1, Fraud. This result assumes that
a $20,000,000 scheme will be sufficiently complex to warrant a two-level increase for
"more than minimal planning" under § 2B1 .1(b)(4)(A) or § 2F1.1(b)(2), and that the
defendant receives a three-level reduction for "acceptance of responsibility" under §
3E1.1.
204. TONRY, supra note 2, at 11 (emphasis added). For similar comments by
other critics, see supra note 195.
205. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 60, tbl. 18 [hereinafter
1995 ANNUAL REPORT].
206. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 187, at 52-53, thl. 20.
207. BUREAU OF JUSTICESTATISTICS, U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, 1993 SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 531, tbl. 5.49 [hereinafter 1993 SOURCEBOOK].
208. "Intermittent confinement (custody for intervals of time) may be ordered as
a condition of probation during the first year of probation." U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3(d) (1995).
209. "Residence in a community treatment center, halfway house or similar
facility may be imposed as a condition of probation . . . ." U.S.S.G. § 5B1.4(b)(19).
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or home detention21°-as a condition of probation. "  However, even
if one assumes that by nonimprisonment sentences Tonry refers only to
straight probation without so much as a day even of community or home
confinement,1  the Guidelines system now produces such sentences in
one of every seven cases.2 3  Any system that generates sentences that
210. "Home detention may be imposed as a condition of probation. . . as a
substitute for imprisonment." U.S.S.G. § 5B1.4(b)(20).
211. In 1993, 7.9% of all federal sentences were sentences of probation with
some condition of confinement. 1993 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 207, at 531 thl. 5.49.
Thus, in that year 34.8% of all probationary sentences included some condition of
confinement. Id. In 1994, 7.8% of all federal sentences involved probation with a
condition of confinement. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 187, at 53 thl. 20. Hence,
in 1994, 35.1% of all probationary sentences included a condition of confinement. Id.
In 1995, 7.8% of federal sentences were to probation with a condition of confinement.
1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 205, at 60 tbl. 18. Therefore, in 1995, 36.6% of
probationary sentences included a condition of confinement. id.
212. In addition to stating in Chapter One of his book that the Guidelines "allow
virtually no role for nonimprisonment sentences," TONIRY, supra note 2, Professor Tonry
declares in Chapter Three that "despite burgeoning interest nationally in intermediate
sanctions since 1980, the guidelines do not authorize their use." Id. at 79 (emphasis
added). This is incorrect. The Guidelines expressly authorize judges to impose
restitution, fines, community confinement, home detention, community service,
occupational restrictions, participation in mental health or substance abuse programs as
conditions of probation or of supervised release. U.S.S.G. § 5B1.4(b).
Two sentences after asserting that the Guidelines "do not authorize" intermediate
punishments, Professor Tonry concedes that they do, saying, "Penalties such as house
arrest, intensively supervised probation, restitution, community service, and outpatient
drug or sex-offender treatment, though in widespread use in many states, may be ordered
only as conditions to probation." Id. (emphasis added). This statement is true.
However, Professor Tonry seems to imply that it is preferable to impose community
service or house arrest as a separate penalty rather than as a condition of probation, but
nowhere in his book does he explain this preference.
Professor Tonry has done me the honor of reviewing this article. His explanation
of these passages is that he would have preferred a guideline system in which the
sentencing grid contained a band of cells such as those now providing for sentences of
roughly 12 to 24 months of imprisonment, for which the "presumptive" sentence would
be an intermediate sanction rather than either probation or a term of imprisonment. Letter
from Michael Tonry to Frank Bowman, (Sept. 18, 1996) (on file with the author). His
preferred system would also have included another band of cells in which "judges had
discretion to impose a prison sentence or an intermediate [sanction]." Id.
213. See, e.g., 1993 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 207, at 531 tbl. 5.49 (14.8% of
federal sentences were "probation only"); 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 187, at 53
thl. 20 (14.4% of federal sentences were "probation only"); 1995 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 205, at 60 tbl. 18 (13.6% of federal sentences were "probation only").
Professor Tonry asserts, "In 1993, only 14.8% of convicted [federal] offenders
received straight probation (i.e., without confinement conditions) and thus in less than
one-sixth of federal convictions was it possible for a judge to sentence a defendant to an
intermediate sanction." TOINRY, supra note 2, at 79. This is a marked misreading of the
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do not require prison terms for more than one-fifth of all defendants, and
do not require confinement of any type for any period for one defendant
in seven can hardly be said to have eliminated all intermediate sanctions.
What is accurate to say about the Guidelines is that their advent has
undoubtedly reduced, and reduced markedly, the frequency with which
federal judges impose probationary sentences.214 Nonetheless, I submit
that those who are distressed over the Guideline system's "failure" to
mandate alternatives to incarceration in a high percentage of cases
misapprehend the role of the federal criminal justice system. Although
exceptions certainly exist,215 as a rule defendants are in the federal
system instead of a state system because they have done something
sufficiently heinous in character or far-reaching in effect that it is a matter
evidence, even employing Tonry's own definitions of terms. As previously noted, supra
note 211, in 1993, in addition to the 14.8% of federal defendants who received straight
probation, another 7.9% were given probationary sentences with some "confinement
conditions." All "confinement conditions" which can by law be imposed on federal
probationers-intermittent confinement, community confinement, halfway houses, home
confinement-are "intermediate sanctions." Most of these conditions are listed by
Professor Tonry himself elsewhere in his book as examples of "intermediate sanctions"
desirable as alternatives to "imprisonment." Tonry, supra at note 2, 109-14 ("boot
camps"), 117-20 (house arrest and electronic monitoring), 120-21 ("day reporting
centers," a form of nonresidential halfway house). Therefore, by Tonry's own terms,
intermediate sanctions short of "imprisonment" were in fact imposed in 22.7%, and not
14.8%, of all federal cases in 1993.
Professor Tonry's conclusion that "in less than one-sixth of federal convictions was
it possible for a judge to sentence a defendant to an intermediate sanction" is also
inaccurate. Id. at 79 (emphasis added). The quoted statistic reveals only how many
defendants were sentenced to such sanctions; it says nothing whatever about the number
of cases in which the Guidelines gave the sentencing judge an option to impose an
"intermediate sanction," but the judge declined to exercise it.
One may well view the undeniable reduction in probationary, noncustodial sentences
since the adoption of the Guidelines, see infra note 214, as bad, or even calamitous. The
point should, however, be argued fairly on the facts as they exist.
214. The percentage of federal offenders sentenced to prison has been creeping
upwards for years. In 1982, 51.1% of convicted federal defendants were sentenced to a
term of imprisonment. 1993 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 207, at 494-95 tbl. 5.22. In 1987,
53.0% of federal defendants were sent to prison. Id. In 1987, the year before the
Guidelines went into effect, the imprisonment rate was 53.0%. Id. In 1988, the first year
the Guidelines were in operation, the percentage rose to 58.5% Id. By 1992, 64.7% of
convicted federal offenders were sent to prison for some period. Id. In 1994 the rate was
77.8%. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 187, at 52 tbl. 20.
215. For example, there are a host of relatively minor offenses, such as single,
noncommercial violations of the Migratory Bird Act, 18 U.S.C. § 41 (1994), that are
nonetheless under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. Similarly, theft from
the United States mails, 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1994), and forgery of Treasury checks, 18
U.S.C. § 510 (1994), are prosecuted in federal courts even where the amount of loss may
not be great.
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of interest to the national government, or because the crime is sufficiently
complex that the states lack the resources to do much about it.
216
Even though federal statutory law may allow federal prosecution of
defendants who have committed relatively minor crimes, 17 or crimes
over which the states have concurrent jurisdiction,"' the declination
policies of most United States Attorney's Offices are designed to ensure
that the scarce resources of the national government are not exhausted on
insignificant matters. 219  As a rule, the federal courts do not deal with
drunk drivers, petty thieves, barroom brawlers, and similar candidates for
probationary intervention. The expression, "Don't make a federal case
out of it," embodies a truth about federal criminal courts-they are, and
should be, largely reserved for serious offenses which, in the event of
conviction, merit serious punishment.'
216. Salient examples of the difficulties faced by local prosecutors in dealing with
complex cases are fraud cases and international drug trafficking cases. When I was a
Deputy District Attorney in Denver, Colorado, as a practical matter we did not handle
fraud cases. Even though fraud was certainly illegal under Colorado state law, neither
the police nor the local prosecutors had the resources or the expertise to investigate or
prosecute such cases. It was simply understood that cases of that sort were federal. For
a discussion of the difficulties states face in dealing with narcotics traffickers whose
operations cross state and national borders, see Frank 0. Bowman, III, Playing "21"
With Narcotics Enforcement.: A Response to Professor Carrington, 52 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 937, 955-64 (1995).
217. For example, there is no minimum quantity of narcotics for prosecution
under federal narcotics statutes, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994), nor is there a minimum amount
of fraud loss required for prosecution under the federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1341 (1994).
218. For example, all states have laws prohibiting trafficking in cocaine, as does
the federal government. See, e.g., COL. REV. STAT. § 18-18-105 (1988) (prohibiting in
Colorado the distribution, manufacturing, dispensing, sale, or possession of controlled
substances, including cocaine); cf. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
219. For example, in the early 1990's, when I reviewed case intake decisions at
the Southern Criminal Division (Major Crimes Unit) of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of Florida, the declination policies dictated that, absent special
circumstances, the Office would not accept for prosecution cocaine trafficking cases
involving less than five kilograms of cocaine (the Miami wholesale value of which was
approximately $85,000-$115,000) or fraud cases in which the loss was less than $100,000.
220. It is for this reason, among others, that comparisons between rates of
incarceration in the federal courts and rates of incarceration in state courts are not
particularly instructive. The overwhelming majority of state defendants who receive
probation, even for felony convictions, would not be prosecuted in federal court at all.
It is nonetheless interesting to note that the rate of incarceration of statefelony defendants
is higher than the overall federal rate of imprisonment. For example, in 1992, the most
recent year in which statistics are available for both state and federal courts, the rate of
incarceration (defined as a sentence to either a prison or a jail) for convicted state felony
defendants was 70%, while 30% of state felons received probation. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1994 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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In the case of federal white collar crime prosecutions, the question
is not why the Guidelines now require some term of imprisonment in so
many federal cases. The question ought to be why any United States
Attorney's Office should ever expend its resources on an economic
offense not serious enough to demand imprisonment as a penalty. At the
end of the day, if there is a criticism to be made about white collar
criminal sentences under the Guidelines, it is that they are often too short
in relation to their moral seriousness, in relation to the harm they cause,
and in relation to the investment of resources required to prosecute them.
2. GUIDELINE DRUG SENTENCES ARE TOO LONG
Drug sentences imposed under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are
another matter altogether. Ironically, for a system whose very existence
is premised on the search for consistency, many of the undoubted defects
of the Guidelines result largely from failures to live up to their own
guiding principles. A primary example of this failure is the absolute
length of drug sentences.
Many criticisms of the Guidelines are couched in terms of
process-complaints about the complexity of the grid, the length of the
manual, the necessity for time-consuming fact-finding sentencing
hearings, the numerous appeals. But if you scrutinize these complaints,
you soon discover that the burr under the critic's saddle is not really
process at all. Instead, the true source of the gall is that some forty
percent of federal criminal cases are drug cases," z and the Guidelines,
taken together with mandatory minimum sentences, compel the imposition
of very long sentences on drug sellers. These sentences are long relative
to the previously settled expectations of the participants in the federal
system.' 2 They are long as a percentage of the duration of any human
STATISTICS, 487 tbl. 5.50 [hereinafter 1994 SOURCEBOOK]. In 1992, only 64.7% of all
federal prisoners were sent to prison for some period. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
187, at 52 tbl. 20. Even the felony incarceration rates for the state and federal systems
are not dissimilar. As noted, the state felony incarceration rate for 1992 was 70%; in
1992, 77.5% of federal defendants convicted of a felony received some period of
incarceration. 1994 SOURCEBOOK supra at 452 tbl. 5.21.
221. During fiscal year 1995, drug cases accounted for 39.9% of sentenced
defendants. 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 205, at 43 tbl 10. There is in fact a
modest downward trend in the percentage of drug cases in the federal courts. During
1994, drug cases accounted for 41.8% of sentenced defendants. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 187, at 39 tbl. 12. In 1993 the figure was 43.9%. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 106, at 55 fig. B.
222. Of course, very long, even cruelly long, sentences for narcotics offenses
were hardly unknown before the Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Espinoza, 481
F.2d 553, 554 (5th Cir. 1973), in which the defendant was sentenced to fifteen years
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life. They are based primarily on the quantity of drugs a defendant was
buying, selling, or transporting.' There is relatively little room for
considerations of the defendant's role in the offense.' Therefore
judges find themselves sending away for a great many years a lot of folks
who do not look or feel much like Pablo Escobar.
Now I have no truck with drug dealers. I do not favor
legalization.' I have prosecuted many traffickers and urged their
lengthy incarceration with zeal, and witnessed its imposition with
satisfaction. While I confess to stray libertarian impulses concerning
freedom over one's own vices, I am finally convinced that the destructive
impact of hard narcotics on human personalities and on the communities
they inhabit is so great that prohibition is required. Moreover, regardless
of my feelings about the harms caused by drug consumption, I have no
moral qualms whatever about imprisoning drug sellers for substantial
terms. They are a class of persons who have enlisted for pecuniary gain
in an industry whose business practices notoriously include the murder of
judges,' policemen, competitors, unruly employees, welshing
customers, and unlucky innocent bystanders.
But even stern retributive justice has its limits. Those limits are, or
ought to be, imposed not only because of namby-pamby considerations
like mercy, which go unmentioned in the Guidelines' preamble, but also
because of the hard-nosed utilitarian objective of crime control achieved
through deterrence and incapacitation, which is a philosophical pillar of
the Guidelines system.' Put simply, even if we were justified on
moral grounds in imprisoning every drug seller for life, such a policy
would make no practical sense.
imprisonment for distribution of 0.62 grams of heroin.
223. See U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.1 (1995).
224. Drug defendants can receive enhancements and reductions in their offense
levels based on their aggravating, U.S.S.G. § 31.l, or mitigating, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2,
roles in the offense of conviction. However, the size of the adjustments (plus or minus
four levels) is small relative to the long sentences often imposed for narcotics offenses.
225. For thoughts on narcotics enforcement in general, see Bowman, supra note
216, passim.
226. Colombian drug traffickers wiped out nearly the entire Colombian judiciary.
See Michael Isikoff, Medellin Cartel Leaders Offered U. S. a Deal: Officials Rebuffed Plan
That Sought Amnesty for Ending Drug Trade, Providing Data on Leftists, WASH. POST,
July 20, 1988, at A4. The Sicilian Mafia, long involved in heroin trafficking, has carried
out a similar campaign of assassination against Italian judges. See Alan Cowel, Sicily
Bomb Kills Anti-Mafia Fighter and 5 Others, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1992, at A9; see also
STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR
TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS 93-96 (1993).
227. See U.S.S.G. Ch. I Pt. A(3).
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Even if one believes, as I do, in the deterrent power of
imprisonment,' a point exists beyond which the prospect of
incarceration exhausts its deterrent effect. My own purely personal guess
(based primarily on years of plea negotiations and discussions with
defendants who have, as we say, "flipped," and decided to cooperate with
the government) is that any sentence that exceeds about ten years of real
prison time does not provide additional deterrence. Any adult not
deterred by a decade in a cell will not be deterred by the prospect of two
decades, or three, or four.
Incapacitation is also of limited usefulness in narcotics cases. Drug
crimes, like robbery and theft, are crimes of greed. But unlike robbery
and theft, drug crimes are market-driven. If the police catch and
imprison Smith, whose life's work is sticking up 7-1 Is, a certain number
of 7-1 Is that would have been robbed had Smith not been caught will go
unrobbed. Other 7-11 robbers will be at work while Smith is imprisoned,
but not because there is an unmet "demand" for 7-11 robberies in Smith's
absence.
Not so with drug crimes. So long as there is a population of drug
users willing to pay for their peculiar pleasures, market pressure exists to
replace any imprisoned dealer. Whether the demand for a seller will be
filled depends on the size of the market, that is, on the number of
customers and the prices they are willing to pay, and on whether potential
replacement dealers perceive that the risks of selling are worth the
rewards. Thus, imprisonment plays a role in fighting drug trafficking,
but that role is not so much to incapacitate drug dealers as to affect the
cost-benefit calculations of their prospective replacements.
One other consideration is at work in sentencing which transcends
and combines the just deserts and crime control rationales for punishment.
The criminal justice system serves not only the narrow community of
victims, offenders, and those teetering on the brink of offending, it also
serves the educational function of putting into highly visible action the
moral vision of the community. The severity of punishment the society
assigns any given crime ought to reflect its moral gravity-the graver the
offense, the more severe the punishment. Likewise, if punishment deters
crime among the unpunished and prevents it altogether among the
imprisoned, the severity of punishment for any particular crime should
reflect the degree to which society feels the need to prevent that crime.
Beyond both these considerations, the severity with which a society
punishes a particular act is, or should be, an accurate mirror of the degree
of disapproval the community has for the act. Severe punishment is a
228. For general discussions of the deterrent effect of punishment, see WILSON,
supra note 16, at 193-204, and VON HIRSCH, supra note 16, at 37-44, 61-65.
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way of illustrating in the most dramatic fashion the moral code of the
society. The function of punishment I am describing here has been
characterized as the "reprobative" or "expressive" function of
punishment.' Severe drug trafficking penalties place a dramatically
visible price on society's aversion to the use and sale of addictive drugs,
and in doing so assist the members of society to internalize that
aversion.' Still, it is very difficult to argue that those federal drug
sentences that are far longer than, perhaps double, the length necessary
to achieve maximal individual deterrence are nonetheless acceptable
because of their reprobative or expressive value. Some additional
increment of punishment for reprobative effect may be justifiable; raising
the otherwise appropriate penalty by fifty or one hundred percent is not.
In order to be minimally consistent with the announced principles of
the Guidelines, drug sentences should be no more severe than the conduct
at issue deserves, 31 and no longer than necessary to achieve the
maximum possible deterrence. By this standard, many, though by no
means all, drug sentences imposed under the Guidelines fail. Five years
in a federal penitentiary is just too long for mere possession of five grams
of crack cocaine.' Such a sentence is so disproportionate to the harm
the crime causes, either to the perpetrator or anyone else, as to border on
the morally offensive. 3 Likewise, although a sentence of fifteen to
twenty years for a transporter of fifty kilograms of cocaine' may, if
one subscribes to a fairly stern view of such undertakings, be morally
229. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 16, at 48-49 and sources cited therein.
230. For a discussion of whether the anti-drug efforts of the past twenty-five years
can be deemed successful, at least in part because these efforts have served a
"reprobative" or expressive" function, see Bowman, supra note 216, at 969-71.
231. See Nemerson, supra note 9, at 682 (discussing what the author calls "a
'maximum appropriate sentence'-that is, an upper limit beyond which punishment,
though authorized by positive law, is morally indefensible").
232. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1994). It should be noted that the number of
federal prisoners incarcerated for mere possession of narcotics is quite small. Only four
percent of those serving federal sentences for drug crimes are serving time for possession
offenses. 1993 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 207, at 632.
233. Indeed, although it is a closer case, absent some aggravating factor such as
a prior trafficking conviction, I would not argue strenuously with anyone who views a five
year prison term for distribution of five grams of crack as disproportionately severe.
234. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2) (1995), the base offense level is 36 for
possession with intent to distribute 50 kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Assuming no reductions in offense level (such as for acceptance of
responsibility, § 3E1.1) no increases in offense level (such as for role in the offense, §
3B1.1), and assuming that the defendant had no prior convictions, his sentencing range
would be 188-235 months, or a range of just over fifteen years to just under twenty years.
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justifiable, by any practical measure, it is counterproductive and
extremely expensive overkill. 5
In defense of the Sentencing Commission, certain drug sentences are
embedded in statute and the Commission could not change them even if
it were so inclined. For example, the minimum mandatory sentences of
five years for possession of five grams of crack cocaine3 and ten years
for possession with intent to distribute five kilograms of powder
cocaine 7 are statutory and can be changed only by legislative
enactment. Nonetheless, no statute mandated that the original
Commission construct a scheme in which sentences for more than
statutory minimum quantities of narcotics escalate upwards from the
statutory minimums to the top of the sentencing chart with neat geometric
proportionality.' The maximum sentence for a first time drug
offender, regardless of amount and absent some special aggravating
factor, need not have been set (as it was in 1989) at life
imprisonment. The Commission could and should have chosen some
figure dictated less by considerations of symmetry and more by careful
consideration of the stated goals of the system.
Both the Commission and Congress have, in recent years, nudged
drug sentences downward a bit. For example, the maximum offense level
on the drug quantity table was dropped in 1994 from Level 42 to Level
38.1 In practical terms, this change reduced the maximum prison term
for a first-time offender based purely on the quantity of narcotics from
235. See Bowman, supra note 216, at 983.
Treating drug crime as a law enforcement problem rather than as warfare
requires . . . that we abandon the illusion that imposing sentences of a
"jillion" years on the criminal we catch today will eliminate the necessity
of sentencing another criminal next year and the next and the next. It
requires us to decide whether we want to incarcerate one drug dealer for
forty years, or four drug dealers for ten years, or eight drug dealers for
five years. The current approach is to incarcerate eight dealers for forty
years-and worry about the long-term costs tomorrow.
Id.
236. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).
237. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii).
238. See Tonry, supra note 52, at 358 (contending that the Commission should
treat minimum mandatory sentences as "trumps" rather than as "guideposts"); Stith &
Koh, supra note 7, at 283 (arguing that "the Commission was not required . ..to
incorporate statutory minimum sentences in the way it has").
239. See U.S.$.G. § § 2D1.1, Ch. 5 Pt. A. The Sentencing Table assigns an
offense level of 42, which produces a guideline range of 360 months to life imprisonment
for an offender (even first-time offenders), for the highest quantities of drugs, (for
example, more than 1500 kilograms of cocaine).
240. U.S.S.G. app. C amend. 505 (1994).
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life imprisonment to twenty-four years, five months." Similarly, the
so-called "safety valve" legislation passed by Congress in 1994 allows
judges to sentence certain low-level, first-time, non-violent drug offenders
below the otherwise applicable statutory minimum sentence. 2 2  The
Sentencing Commission thereafter passed, and Congress accepted, an
amendment to the Guidelines which allows an additional two-offense-level
reduction to the same class of defendants.'
Nonetheless, a very high overall level for drug sentences was frozen
in amber by the early choices of the Commission, and the raw,
unpalatable political truth is that drug sentences will not be materially
reduced any time soon, certainly not for years, perhaps not for decades.
Most of what the current Sentencing Commission might, in its heart of
hearts, like to do in that direction would be derided by an Administration
determined not to be branded "soft on crime,"' and blocked by a
Congress equally determined not to be outflanked to the right.
My own rueful prediction is that drug sentences will never be
seriously reduced until some future irreproachably socially conservative
president recasts the debate from crime to economics and declares that the
cost of locking up so many drug sellers for so very long is just too great.
E. A Generous Consistency: Taking the Principles of the Guidelines
Seriously
Honest adherence to the principles that actuate the Guidelines would
require not only that we reduce the severity of drug sentences, but also
that we rethink our approach to crime control generally, and to those
human beings who are now serving, may in the future serve, or have in
241. Comparethe 1989 and 1995 versions of U.S.S.G. § 2D1. I, the Drug Table,
and Ch. 5, Pt. A, the Sentencing Table.
242. 18 U.S.C. § 3555(0 (1994); see also Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 17 (1996); U.S.S.G. app. C
amend. 509 (1995).
243. Guidelines Amendment 515 added § 2D 1. 1(b)(4), which decreases by two
levels the offense level of any defendant who meets the criteria of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(0,
as embodied in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. See U.S.S.G. app. C amend. 515 (1995).
244. The most recent evidence of this tendency was the Administration's reflexive
opposition to the crack/powder amendment last year, despite the fact that, based on my
own experience, relatively few line prosecutors would be prepared to defend the
rationality of the 100-1 crack/powder ratio. In defense of the Administration's political
instincts, however, there can be little doubt that politicians of the opposite party were
salivating at the prospect of berating the Clinton Justice Department for going soft on drug
dealers.
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the past served sentences meted out by the federal criminal justice
apparatus.2
Both the development of the Guidelines and the resurgence of capital
punishment stem from the perception of accelerating social breakdown,
a growing fear of crime, and rising revulsion against the culture of excuse
which seems to hold no one responsible for his own actions. The public
clamor has been matched by a turn of the intellectual wheel. Punishment
is no longer therapeutic. It is instead to be justified as society's moral
response to the choice between good and evil freely exercised by an
autonomous moral being. The outer limits of punishment are to be set by
what is deserved. The actual sentence meted out can be set inside those
limits by utilitarian considerations of incapacitation and general and
specific deterrence. Rehabilitation is out. Just deserts is in. We are all
near-Kantians now.'
Despite some cynicism about the ease with which the polemicists of
the political right seem to have become disciples of Immanuel Kant, I am
myself much more comfortable with a system of criminal punishment that
rests on the premise that people have the power of choice, and that holds
people responsible for the choices they make. At the end of the day,
when it comes to criminal behavior, particularly serious criminal
behavior, I don't much want to understand you. I don't want to feel your
pain. I want you to behave, and if you will not, then to accept the
consequences of your misbehavior with no expectation that every
regrettable circumstance of your prior life will mitigate your punishment.
Nonetheless, it is ghastly and unseemly, not to speak of intellectually
inconsistent, that we insist on the power of criminal defendants to choose
between good and evil only as a justification for killing or caging them.
After all, the moral justification for punishment in a system which
emphasizes in roughly equal measure just deserts and crime control
through deterrence assumes that human beings have the power, not
merely to choose evil, but also to choose good. Moreover, the utilitarian
claim of the Guidelines, that criminal punishment can prevent crime
245. "It requires no great penetration to discern that modem controversies
surrounding penal rehabilitationism are in significant degree debates about human nature.
... [C]onflicting theories of crime causation and penal treatment also rest ultimately on
opposing perceptions of human character and potential. It is this circumstance that most
clearly identifies issues of penal policy with the larger political controversies of the time."
ALLEN, supra note 15, at 40.
246. Kant himself would not admit that even the reduction of deserved punishment
could be justified on utilitarian grounds. He wrote, "The law concerning punishment is
a categorical imperative, and woe to him who rummages around in the winding paths of
a theory of happiness for some advantage to be gained by releasing the criminal from
punishment or by reducing the amount of it . . . ." IMMANUEL KANT, THE
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (John Ladd trans., 1965).
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through both general and specific deterrence, assumes that the actions of
the state can influence the choice. Thus, while I believe in the power of
choice, and believe that it does justify punishment, even very severe
punishment, I also insist that a society which demands the unflinching
imposition of stringent penalties as punishment for the choice of evil bears
a heavy responsibility for encouraging, fostering, and nurturing those
conditions which strengthen the disposition to choose the good.
I find no crippling defect in a guidelines sentencing system unwilling
to excuse the poor, the young, the immigrant, the ignorant, or the
oppressed for crime. I am unwilling, however, to declare what seems to
me both plainly untrue, and ultimately immoral-that the only answer to
crime is punishment. To hold otherwise is to say of humans what we
would not say of dogs-that they respond only to the lash, and that in our
anguished search for solutions to the scourge of crime, we owe our fellow
creatures no more than the lash and the threat of the lash.
In policy terms, the national movement toward tougher and more
determinate penalties, of which the federal sentencing guidelines scheme
is only one example, is, at best, half of a sensible and moral response to
the problem of crime in America. The other half must be a commitment
to alleviating those social, cultural, and economic conditions which breed
crime. Until the country makes a commitment to the prevention of crime
equal in resources and fixity of purpose to the commitment to punish
embodied in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, our national romance
with determinate sentencing will remain troubled and uneasy.
IV. CONCLUSION
I like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. I confess that this feeling
may be only the perverse affection that experienced practitioners in any
corner of the law come to feel for their own arcane specialty.
Nonetheless, I sense a growing acceptance of the Guidelines, and even a
(sometimes grudging) recognition of their virtues, among a rising
proportion of those of us who work daily in federal criminal practice.
Judge Cabranes is wrong. The Guidelines are not a failure.
Still Judge Cabranes and other Guidelines critics are indisputably
correct in at least two respects. First, the Guidelines are a very long way
from perfect, and indeed remain a very long distance from the irreducible
minimum level of imperfection inevitable in any human legal system.
The Guidelines can and should be made simpler, both in terms of use by
legal professionals and their comprehensibility to nonprofessionals
affected by the results they generate. Drug sentences should, in general,
be shortened. Other changes, perhaps including some rethinking of the
way relevant conduct functions in the system, may well be appropriate.
Such changes should, however, be made with caution and with the
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recognition that constant tinkering is in itself an impediment to
consistency and confidence in the system.
Guidelines critics like Judge Cabranes are also partially correct when
they bewail the way in which the Guidelines have redistributed the
exercise of sentencing discretion. As I hope I have made clear, the
limitation of unaccountable judicial discretion is, on balance, a beneficial
result of the Guidelines. The fact that other participants in the criminal
system, in particular prosecutors, probation officers, and indeed the
defendants and their counsel, exercise far more influence over sentencing
than they did before the Guidelines is no cause for alarm. Federal
sentencing proceedings before 1987 were, in effect, a ritualized series of
prayers to the inscrutable, if usually well-intentioned and reasonably
benevolent, sentencing god seated on the bench. Guidelines sentencing
is characterized by the interplay of the guided discretionary choices of a
number of different participants. In this respect, the Guidelines are an
improvement.' 7
The lurking danger to the entire Guidelines enterprise is that the
process of creating guidelines has moved discretion away, not merely
from judges in particular, but from the entire class of persons who work
in the criminal justice system daily and thus deal with defendants face-to-
face as human beings. The Guidelines system has shifted the locus of
sentencing power away from all of the courthouse actors to the
Sentencing Commission in Washington which makes the rules, to the
courts of appeals which interpret the rules in splendid judicial isolation,
to the Justice Department's national policy apparatus (as distinct from
United States Attorney's Offices) which lobbies both the Commission and
Congress, and to Congress which exercises veto power over the entire
rulemaking system. A national rule-making mechanism must exist in
order to establish a national sentencing guidelines system. That is
unavoidable. Nonetheless, the greatest peril to both the moral legitimacy
and the long-term practical success of the guideline structure springs from
its vulnerability to national political currents.
As I have argued above, the legitimacy of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines rests on the view that human beings, even those who commit
serious crimes, are free moral actors who are capable of choosing
247. In United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the Supreme Court noted
that "the sentencing function long has been a peculiarly shared responsibility among the
Branches of Government and has never been thought of as the exclusive constitutional
province of any one branch." Id. at 390. Although this observation was made in the
course of responding to separation of powers objections to placing the Sentencing
Commission in the judicial branch, it suggests a sentencing model of multi-party
interaction that is much closer to the Guidelines system than the virtual judicial monopoly
on sentencing decisions under the former system.
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between good and evil, and that the society is not at liberty to treat even
convicted criminals as animals to be caged for periods that have no
necessary relation either to desert or a rational scheme of deterrence. It
is, regrettably but I think undeniably, far easier for national policymakers
who never see criminal defendants as individuals to objectify them, to
consider them as statistics, or simply to brand them with the Mark of
Cain and cease thinking of them as members of society at all.
This mindset was graphically on display in last fall's brouhaha over
the Commission's crack and money laundering amendments. Deep down,
both congressmen and Justice Department officials surely knew that some
adjustment in both areas was appropriate. Yet neither Congress nor the
Administration could resist pandering to the fear of the electorate. I do
not believe that the crack/money laundering debacle necessarily
foreshadows permanent political gridlock in sentencing reform. Indeed,
my experience as Special Counsel to the Sentencing Commission during
1995-96 suggests that political lessons have been learned which could
make future compromise more likely, on the crack and money laundering
issues as well as on broader systemic concerns. On the other hand, if I
am wrong in my interpretation of such small hopeful auguries, then the
politicization of sentencing law will impose a one-way ratchet on every
future reform proposal, slowly transforming what is, in my view, an
appropriately stern system of punishment into a straightjacket so inflexible
and so unsustainably expensive that Judge Cabranes' many prayers for its
abolition will at last be answered.
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